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ABSTRACT 
A New Approach to Mitigate the Impact of Distributed Generation on the Overcurrent Protection 
Scheme of Radial Distribution Feeders. (December 2008) 
Hamed B. Funmilayo, B.Sc., Kansas State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Karen Butler-Purry 
 
Increased Distributed Generation (DG) presence on radial distribution feeders is 
becoming a common trend. The existing Overcurrent Protection (OCP) scheme on such feeders 
consists mainly of overcurrent protection devices (OCPDs) such as fuses and reclosers. When 
DG is placed on the remote end of a 3-phase lateral, the radial configuration of the feeder is lost. 
As a result, OCP issues may arise which lead to permanent outages even when the fault is 
temporary. This thesis presents a new approach that revises the existing OCP scheme of a radial 
feeder to address the presence of DG. The fuses on the laterals with DGs are removed and multi-
function recloser/relays (MFRs) are added to address three specific OCP issues; fuse fatigue, 
nuisance fuse blowing, and fuse misoperation. 
 The new approach requires no communication medium, provides backup protection for 
the DG unit, and allows the remaining laterals to retain their existing protective devices. The 
results are reported using the IEEE 34 node radial test feeder to validate the new approach and 
the IEEE 123 node radial test feeder to generalize the approach. The new approach completely 
mitigated the fuse misoperation and nuisance fuse blowing issues and most of the fuse fatigue 
issues that were present on the radial test feeders. Specifically, the approach demonstrates that 
coordination between the existing protection devices on radial distribution feeders is maintained 
in the presence of DG. 
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CHAPTER I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Background 
The normal operation of an electrical power system involves the transfer of electricity 
from the generation points to various customers (commercial, industrial, and residential). The 
process integrates three major systems: generation, transmission, and distribution. The 
transmission system delivers the bulk electric power from the generation stations to substations 
where the distribution system begins. 
In the distribution system, each substation is connected to the customers through one or 
more primary feeders. The majority of the distribution feeders are radial in which there is only 
one path for the electric power to flow from the substation to the customers. The feeder may 
operate at the primary voltage level (4 – 34.5kV) for industrial loads, or at secondary voltage 
levels (120/240V) for residential loads [1]. The feeder components include line segments, loads 
which may be in 3-phase, 2-phase or 1-phase configuration, in-line transformers, shunt capacitor 
banks, switches, voltage regulators, and overcurrent protection devices (OCPDs). The feeder 
lines may be in an overhead or underground configuration, although overhead lines are more 
common due to the economic benefits they provide. The feeder consist of the “main,” typically a 
3-phase 4 wire circuit, and laterals which tap into the main as 3-phase, 2-phase or 1-phase lines. 
Most loads on the feeder are located on the laterals. The feeder is inherently unbalanced because 
of the unequal spacing of the laterals and uneven distribution of the 1-phase loads [2] . 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style and format of IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery. 
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One of the primary objectives of operating a radial distribution feeder is to maintain a 
high level of service continuity with minimal loss of power during intolerable conditions. 
Because radial distribution feeders are mostly overhead lines, they are often exposed to the 
environment and easily affected by external disturbances such as lightning, thunderstorm, 
animals, and traffic accidents. These disturbances are known as faults, 80% of which are 
temporary and the remaining 20% are permanent [3]. The duration of the fault can range 
between ¼ cycle to a few cycles [4]. The resulting fault current is a function of the system 
impedances between the substation and the fault whose magnitude may be several orders higher 
than the normal operating current on the feeder. The fault can cause damage to the feeder 
components when not promptly cleared or isolated from the feeder. Owing to the radial nature of 
the feeder simple overcurrent protective devices, fuses and reclosers, are traditionally employed 
to reduce the impact of the fault on the feeder. The recloser is often located on the main, while 
most fuses are located on the laterals. The fuse is a single-shot device that isolates a fault by 
removing the faulted lateral, while the recloser is a multiple-shot device that clears and isolates a 
fault on the feeder with a preset sequence of openings and reclosures [5]. These OCPDs 
continuously monitor the phase current levels on the feeder and are coordinated such that faults 
on the feeder are isolated in order to affect fewer customers. Fuses are inexpensive and reliable 
devices that melt and blow within a few cycles due to a high magnitude fault current. Therefore, 
the fuse will have to be replaced often due to the damage created by the fault current. In order to 
minimize the number of fuse damages during a fault, a recloser is selected to temporarily de-
energize the feeder to clear the fault prior to the fuse operation.This concept is known as a “fuse 
saving operation”. Hence, the main objective of an OCP scheme with fuse saving operation is to 
minimize the frequency of permanent outages  [1], [6] .  
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Presently, the basic transfer of electric power is witnessing dramatic changes as active 
generation is now becoming a common trend at the distribution feeder level. The opposition to 
transmission expansion and the need to accommodate the growing electricity demand are major 
reasons that smaller sources known as distributed generators (DG) are added to the feeder. Some 
immediate benefits of operating DGs in parallel with feeders include reduction of  feeder power 
losses to include transmission and distribution (T&D) costs [7]. However, the presence of one or 
more DGs on a feeder causes a redistribution of the normal and fault current through the OCPDs. 
In such situations, the magnitude of the phase current through the OCPDs may increase, decrease 
or remain the same. The variation in the current measurement may affect the coordination 
between the OCPDs and allow temporary faults to result in permanent outages. In addition, the 
feeder being no longer radial implies a need to revisit the selectivity of the existing OCPDs on 
the feeder. 
1.2.  Research Objective and Organization 
The objective of this thesis work is to develop a new approach to mitigate the impact of 
DG on an existing OCP scheme of radial distribution feeders. The new approach requires 
minimal changes to the existing OCP scheme when the DG is added to the feeder and ensures 
that the OCPDs on the scheme still maintain their settings. To achieve the objective, an OCP 
scheme was implemented on two IEEE Radial Test Feeders and then DG was added to 
investigate the OCP issues that arose. Finally, the new approach was developed and applied to 
the existing OCP scheme to mitigate the issues. In the approach, protection changes occur only 
at the lateral on which the DG is located and the settings of the fuses and feeder reclosers are 
unchanged. The approach incorporates protection at the system, interconnection, and DG unit 
levels. 
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This thesis work consists of six chapters. In Chapter I, an introduction of this research 
work and an organization of the thesis are presented. The discussions in Chapter II are broad but 
mainly consist of the literature review and problem formulation. The chapter elaborates on the 
coordination of OCPDs on a typical radial feeder to include an analysis discussing the DG 
impact on the feeder’s OCP scheme. In addition, the existing methods to mitigate the OCP 
problems caused by DG presence are introduced along with the merits and drawbacks of the 
methods. The problem formulation concludes the chapter. In Chapter III, the outline of the new 
approach to the existing OCP scheme as a solution to the formulated problem is presented. The 
system models used in the studies are presented in Chapter IV. The simulation studies and results 
are discussed in Chapter V. Finally, conclusions and future work are given in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER II 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
2.1.  Introduction 
Generally, the addition of DGs to a feeder implies that additional sources of fault current 
are present on the feeder. Therefore, faults which happen to be potentially temporary may likely 
result to permanent outages. It is a common theme that a single DG can cause temporary faults to 
result in permanent outages on the radial distribution feeder. However, as DG presence on the 
feeder becomes prominent, disconnecting the DG at every instance of a fault may be impractical 
and even uneconomical in some cases. Over the past decade, several researchers have dedicated 
considerable effort towards developing methods to mitigate the impact of DG on the OCP 
scheme of radial distribution feeders. Some of these methods address the protection issues by 
providing an entirely new scheme without the use of traditional OCPDs such as fuses. However, 
a typical distribution feeder has several dozens of laterals that are normally protected by fuses 
and it is unforeseeable that all the fuses would be replaced by more advanced devices due to DG. 
The first section of this literature review thus focuses on the radial distribution feeder and the 
conventional OCPDs found on the feeder. 
2.2.  Overcurrent Protection for Radial Feeders 
The traditional OCPDs, fuses and reclosers are applicable for single or multiphase lines 
on radial feeders [8]. Fuses designed for voltages above 600V fall in the category of 
distribution/fuse cutouts or power fuses [1], though power fuses are  specifically employed for 
voltages equal to 34.5kV and higher. Fuse cutouts can be expulsion or liquid-filled types based 
on their characteristics. The expulsion fuse consists of a fuse link that senses the fault current 
and blows after a prolonged time. The links are commonly available as K (fast) or T (slow). The 
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expulsion fuse extinguishes the fault arc when the fault current reaches the zero crossing. The 
circuit interruption is accompanied by a physical demonstration due to the arc energy generated 
in the fault. This fuse type is the most common in overhead lines [1]. On the other hand, the 
current limiting fuse forces the fault current magnitude to zero in order to extinguish the fault 
and no physical demonstration of the arc energy is exhibited in this process. Therefore, such 
fuses are found in locations such as vaults, where expulsion fuses would be hazardous. Fig. 1 
illustrates the fuse’s model, which is based on a Time Current Curve (TCC), and the expulsion 
fuse type device. The fuse model consists of two curves, minimum melt (MM) curve and 
maximum clear (MC) curve. From Fig. 1, the vertical axis represents the duration of the fault 
current through the fuse that would initiate the fuse operation on the MM or MC curve. The 
horizontal axis is the current through the fuse. Therefore, the fuse operates in a time-current band 
between the minimum melt times, when the fuse becomes partially damaged, and the maximum 
clearing times when the fuse is fully damaged. The difference between these times for any given 
fault current through the fuse corresponds to the arcing time of the fuse. The minimum melting 
time is important when the fuse overreaches other devices downstream of the fuse. The fuse 
model can be customized into software packages by using the fuse’s TCC values from the 
manufacturer’s database. 
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Fig. 1     Fuse Device and Time Current Characteristic Curve  
The minimum operating limit for a fuse link is known as the continuous current rating, 
while the maximum limit is the symmetrical interrupting rating. In addition, the fuse is also rated 
based on the system voltage, maximum fault available at the point of application, X/R ratio at the 
point of application, and the load growth. Along with providing lateral protection, fuses protect 
the distribution feeder components such as in-line transformers and shunt capacitor banks. 
Reclosers are circuit interrupters with self-contained controls and breaker. Reclosers are 
less costly than conventional breakers with relays therefore they are mostly used in distribution 
feeders. The recloser can be programmed to de-energize and re-energize the circuit at variable 
intervals in order to clear the fault. The recloser model consists of a fast and delayed curve. The 
first recloser was a hydraulic type introduced in 1939 to provide fault clearing and system 
restoration for 1-phase lines[9]. Since then, there have been hydraulic and electronic type 
reclosers with 1-phase and 3-phase capabilities. A 3-phase recloser includes phase and ground 
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units, while 1-phase reclosers do not have ground units. The 3-phase reclosers are generally 
recommended for protecting the main feeder in order to avoid damage to 3-phase motors and 
prevent potential ferroresonance [9]. Fig. 2 shows the recloser curves and an illustration of the 3-
phase electronic recloser device. The recloser’s fast curve is represented by the letter “A,” while 
the delayed curve is given as “B”. 
 
Fig. 2     Recloser Device and Time Current Characteristic Curve  
The basic function of the recloser’s fast curve is to clear the temporary fault and restore 
service with minimum delay. The reclosing action prevents the temporary fault from becoming 
permanent during which recloser switches from its fast curve to the delayed curve if the fault 
fails to clear initially. The delayed operation is characterized by longer time intervals and is 
followed by a lockout operation in case the fault still fails to clear. Afterwards, the recloser 
would have to be manually reset once it reaches the lockout position. The recloser’s minimum 
operating limit is known as the minimum trip rating, while the maximum limit is the symmetrical 
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interrupting rating. Fig. 3 illustrates a typical operation of a recloser during a fault. The 
illustration presents a recloser programmed to operate in the A-B-B mode. This mode denotes 
one fast operation followed by two delayed operations and a lockout operation.  The A-B-B 
sequence is one of the preferred modes of operation as it reduces the frequency of momentary 
outages and the duty on the substation transformer [9]. In the illustration, the recloser’s contacts 
are initially closed when the load current flows through the recloser. When the fault occurs, the 
magnitude of the current through the recloser becomes several times larger than the normal 
current through the recloser.  Therefore, the recloser undergoes the programmed multiple 
operations in which the contacts open for a defined period known as the reclosing time interval. 
The fast and delayed intervals are based on the settings of the recloser’s TCC given in Fig. 2. 
The next section discusses the process of selecting, setting, and coordinating the OCPDs 
discussed. 
 
Fig. 3     Typical Recloser Operation during Faults (Adopted from [9]) 
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2.3.  Overcurrent Protection Coordination Rules 
Adequate selection and coordination of OCPDs employs the peak load and fault current 
magnitudes at specific locations on a feeder where each OCPD would be applied. The peak load 
current results come from load flow studies that also involve the computation of real and reactive 
power values, and nominal voltage values on a feeder while the short circuit studies provide 
shunt fault current results on a feeder.  The following subsections details the required parameters 
from a feeder and the OCPD ratings used to achieve adequate selection and coordination. 
2.3.1.  Load Flow Studies 
In the load flow study, the parameter observed is the nominal phase current through the 
OCPD. The minimum trip rating for the selected recloser should be 200% of the nominal phase 
current in order to allow for inrush currents from the transformer and load growth [1],[9]. The 
equation in (2.1) assesses the load growth based on three parameters which are the load growth 
rate (g%), the initial and final values of the system load (P0 and Pn ), and the number of years 
considered (nth year) [1], [10]. 
 ( )nn 0P P 1 g= +  (2.1)  
In this thesis work the load growth rate assumed was 1.25% for a five year period. For 
the fuse protecting a lateral, a continuous current rating value of 1.5 times the fuse’s rating was 
used for the T and K tin link fuses [9]. The continuous current through the single fuses protecting 
a 3-phase lateral is based on the loading of that lateral. Therefore, each individual fuse on a 3-
phase lateral may be of the same size [8]. In case of in-line transformers the maximum allowable 
rating for an in-line transformer’s fuse should be 300% of the full load current through the 
transformer in question [11]. Regarding the capacitor fuses, the selected fuse link should have a 
11 
 
 
minimum rating of 135% of the rated load current to account for currents generated by 
harmonics [9].  
2.3.2.  Short Circuit Studies 
In the short circuit study, the two parameters observed include the minimum and 
maximum branch fault current through the OCPD. For the purpose of the studies in this thesis 
work, the minimum fault branch current was a 1-phase grounded fault with a non-zero fault 
resistance placed at the farthest node downstream of the OCPD in question. The maximum 
branch fault current through the OCPD was a 3-phase to ground fault with no fault resistance (or 
1-phase if the line was single phase) placed at the closest node downstream of that OCPD. The 
minimum fault current should exceed the recloser's minimum trip rating or the fuse's continuous 
current rating. Consequently, the maximum fault current should not exceed the OCPD’s 
symmetrical interrupting rating. 
Secondary-side (through) faults are considered to be the most difficult to interrupt by the 
transformer fuse.  The method for calculating the through faults is provided in [12]. Equation 
(2.2) provides the primary fault current (Ipri) using the transformer’s rated voltage (E), the 
impedance ( TZ ), and KVA rating. The calculated primary fault current should be sensed by the 
selected transformer-primary fuse and interrupted in a timely fashion. 
 
T
E
I   pri
3 *Z
=  (2.2)  
 
2
T%
T
Z *10*E
where    Z (Ω)   
kVA
=  
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2.3.3.  Coordination Studies 
Coordination is defined as the process of selecting OCPDs with certain time-current 
settings and their appropriate arrangement in series to clear faults from the system’s lines or 
components according to a preset sequence of operation [1]. The operating times of the primary 
device and the secondary or backup device are two parameters that determine coordination 
between the both OCPDs. The primary device is the closest OCPD that isolates the faulted 
section on the feeder, while the backup device is farther away and operates in case the primary 
device fails to trip. The backup OCPDs are located in an adjacent zone, which typically overlaps 
the primary zone. The backup OCPD device is intended to operate only if the primary device 
fails or is temporarily out of service. Recloser-fuse coordination through the TCC method 
employs the fault values obtained from the short circuit studies (minimum and maximum 
line/bus faults, capacitor faults and transformer faults).The criterion used to determine if the 
recloser and lateral fuses were properly coordinated was that the operating time of the primary 
device was less than that of the assigned backup device. The implication of the coordination 
statement is simplified through the illustration in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.  
Fig. 4 illustrates a portion of a typical distribution feeder with OCPDs and connected to 
the grid through a substation transformer. The feeder is characterized with six nodes (or buses) 
and includes the main and two laterals with loads.  The main runs from node 2 – 4 and 4 – 5, 
while the laterals (assumed as 3-phase) branch out from the main, between node 2 – 4 and node 
4 – 5. The feeder is divided into protection zones that are maintained by the OCPDs (the recloser 
and the fuses). The primary protection on the feeder laterals is provided with a backup 
protection.  In Fig. 4, the recloser is denoted by REC and its primary protection zone is the main 
(between node 2 – 4 and node 4 – 5). The main is typically 3-phase, therefore REC is assumed as 
a 3-phase recloser.  For the fuses (FUSE1 and FUSE2), the primary protection zones are their 
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respective laterals. The laterals can be 1-phase, 2-phase or 3-phase. The laterals are assumed as 
3-phase. Three 1-phase fuses are placed on the individual phase of each lateral where FUSE1 
and FUSE2 are assumed as one of the three 1-phase fuses on each lateral. In the illustration 
given in Fig. 4, the protection zone of the recloser overlaps those of the fuses. The overlap 
implies that the recloser’s backup zone is the laterals [8]. The recloser is coordinated with the 
fuses for temporary and permanent faults on the feeder. If fuse saving is used, the preferred 
sequence for the recloser operation in this case is A-B-B.  If a fault occurs at the location shown 
in Fig. 4, the current through the recloser ( RECI ) and that through the fuse ( 2FUSEI ) are sourced 
from the substation. FUSE2 is the primary OCPD that should isolate the faulted location if the 
fault is permanent while the recloser would be the backup device if FUSE2 failed to isolate the 
faulted location. FUSE2 operation would result in a permanent outage on the lateral after which 
the fuse would have to be replaced. Continuity of service would be maintained at the unfaulted 
sections of the feeder.  
1 2 4 5
REC
FUSE2
                    IFUSE2 = f( I SUB)
IREC = f (ISUB)Substation 
transformer
3
FUSE1
FAULT
6
LOAD1
Grid
LOAD2
 
Fig. 4     A Portion of a Typical Radial Feeder with Recloser and Fuses 
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In Fig. 5, the points 1 and 2 indicate the fault current range ( fMIN fMAXI   to   I ) for which 
coordination between the recloser and FUSE2 holds. For the permanent fault (assuming a 3-
phase fault on the lateral) shown in Fig. 4, point 3 represents the current seen by the 
recloser
AREC
I  on the A curve and point 4 represents the current seen by FUSE2. Fig. 5  shows 
that ( )
AREC
t I  will be less than ( )
2FUSE
t I  for the fault which represents proper coordination of the 
devices to clear a potential temporary fault. Since the fault is permanent, the recloser will close 
its breaker after the breaker has been open for a prescribed amount of time. Point 5 represents the 
current seen by the recloser on the BB curve. Fig. 5 shows that ( )
2FUSE
t I  will be less than 
( )
BBREC
t  for the fault which represents proper coordination of the devices to isolate the 
permanent fault. 
 
Fig. 5     Typical Coordination between a Recloser and a Fuse 
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From the illustration in Fig. 5, the following coordination rules apply to the OCPDs: For 
recloser-fuse coordination during minimum and maximum faults downstream of the lateral fuses, 
the recloser's scaled (A) curve operating time ( )
AREC
t I must be less than the fuse's minimum melt 
(MM) operating time ( )
2FUSE
t I . Also, the fuse's maximum clear (MC) operating time must be 
less than the recloser's non-scaled delayed (BB) curve operating time. 
For component protection devices such as capacitor banks and the in-line transformer 
fuses, the following rules apply: For recloser-fuse coordination during a capacitor fault at a 
capacitor fuse(not illustrated), the fuse’s maximum clear operating time must be less than the 
recloser's scaled (A) curve operating time. For the coordination between a transformer fuse and 
the recloser during a transformer fault, the fuse’s maximum clear (MC) operating time must be 
less than the recloser's scaled (BB) curve operating time. For fuse-fuse coordination, the ratio of 
operating time of the primary fuse's MC curve to that of the backup fuse's MM curve must be 
less than 0.75 [1], [9].  
2.4.  Distributed Generation (DG) in Radial Feeders 
DG is defined as a subset of Distributed Resources (DR) that may be employed in 
smaller capacities as micro (~1W < 5kW), small (5kW < 5 MW), medium (5 MW < 50 MW), 
and large (50 MW < 300 MW). DG technologies include photovoltaics, wind turbines, fuel cells, 
small and micro-sized turbine modules, sterling-engine based generators, and internal 
combustion engine generators [13]. Many of these technologies use renewable energy resources. 
DG can serve as a viable option to provide additional substation and feeder capacity in 
anticipation of future load growth. Some immediate benefits of operating DG in parallel with the 
feeder include reduction of feeder power losses and Transmission & Distribution (T&D) costs. 
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The synchronous generator described in the next paragraph is the common generator used for 
DG employed on distribution feeder.  
The DG unit consists of a synchronous generator directly connected to the associated 
power transformer [8]. The synchronous generator is an alternating-current machine in which the 
rotational speed of normal operation is constant when interconnected with the distribution 
feeder. The generator operates in synchronism with the system frequency and in step with the 
feeder’s voltage. Synchronous generators  have a direct current (dc) field winding to provide 
machine excitation and are generally capable of supplying sustained current for faults on the 
feeder [14]. The fault current infeed from the synchronous generator type depends on the 
prefault voltage, subtransient and transient reactances of the machine, and exciter characteristics. 
The resulting high magnitude of the short circuit from the generator redistributes the fault current 
level on the feeder, thus presents problems to existing overcurrent protection. The relevant 
modeling parameters for the DG include the real and reactive power ratings, per unit 
synchronous, transient, subtransient and zero sequence reactances [15],[16]. Since the 
synchronous generator exhibits non-linearity, the parameters are not linear with the increase in 
generator size and no interpolation or extrapolations are assumed. Therefore, this thesis work 
study is based on actual synchronous generator sizes from [17]. In addition, the default controller 
model from the software of choice as well as the automatic voltage regulator (AVR) for the 
generator was adopted. 
There are five known transformer configurations through which the generator is 
connected to the feeder.  These configurations are wye grounded-wye, wye grounded-delta, 
delta-wye grounded, delta- wye, and delta-delta. Most of the wye configuration is typically 
grounded, while delta-delta configuration type is ungrounded. The delta-delta is the most 
convenient configuration but causes overvoltage issues.  However, the major advantages are the 
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reduction in the infeed fault current from the DG during grounded faults and the control of 
harmonics from non-linear loads [18].  The cause of overvoltages are the 1-phase or 2-phase 
grounded faults causing the voltage level on the un-faulted phase to increase up to 150% above 
the nominal level. The overvoltage issue was avoided by ensuring that there is no 1-phase 
protection device between the DG and the substation [9]. The KVA rating of the transformers 
matched the DG KVA rating[5].  
2.5.  Radial Feeder with DG and Overcurrent Protection Issues 
The OCPDs on a radial distribution feeder normally operate on steady state fault current 
since the feeder is inherently passive. The generation and transmission systems are farther away 
from the feeder such that any transients from the generation system would have decayed over a 
period of time before the fault reaches the distribution feeder. However, when DG is added to the 
feeder lateral, generation is closer to the load and large transients may occur during a fault on the 
feeder. The addition of DG DGP  implies that less real power is required by the substation SUBP to 
provide the total real power demand demandP in (2.3). The combined power provided from the 
sources within the system supplyP  is given in (2.4). 
load losses demand(P  P )  P+ =∑              (2.3) 
DG SUB supply(P  P )  P+ =∑          (2.4) 
The DG penetration level is given by (2.5): 
DG
supply
P
Penetration level (%) 100
P
= ×        (2.5) 
 
Depending on the DG penetration level (size) on the laterals, the fuses may be subject to 
unnecessary damage especially during a fault. Three OCP problems that arise include fuse 
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fatigue, nuisance fuse blowing, and fuse misoperation [19], [20]. In earlier work conducted by 
the authors [21] , [22] to characterize the impact of DG on an OCP scheme for the IEEE 34 Node 
Radial Test Feeder [23], studies indicated that fuse fatigue and nuisance fuse blowing were more 
dependent on the total penetration level of the DGs, while fuse misoperation was dependent on 
the number of DGs at different locations on the feeder. For example, in one of the cases studied, 
three DGs with a total penetration level of 50% placed at different locations on the feeder 
showed the same number of recloser-fuse miscoordination issues as a single DG of the same 
total penetration level. Fig. 6 illustrates how these OCP problems develop after adding DG to a 
lateral of the feeder in Fig. 4.  
For the given fault at the location shown in Fig. 6, two sources (the substation/Grid and 
the DG) now supply the fault current. Therefore, the current through the OCPDs now become 
functions of the substation ( SUBI ) and the infeed current from the DG ( DGI ). The recloser current 
( RECI ) is a function of the substation, the FUSE1 current ( FUSE1I ) is a function of the DG, and the 
FUSE2 current ( FUSE2I ) is a function of the substation and infeed current from the DG. The OCP 
problems may arise as a result of the redistributed fault current and other factors such as DG 
penetration level defined in (2.5). The next subsection discusses possible OCP problems that the 
addition of DG introduces on the existing OCP scheme. 
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Fig. 6     A Portion of a Typical Radial Feeder with a DG, Recloser, and Fuses 
2.5.1. Fuse Fatigue and Nuisance Fuse Blowing 
Fuse fatigue or damage arises when the fuse link begins to melt before the recloser’s fast 
operation [9]. In Fig. 6, the fault located downstream of FUSE2 may cause the fuse to become 
fatigued as shown in Fig. 7. Point 3 on the illustration corresponds to the current seen by the 
recloser RECI  on the A curve and point 4 represents the current seen by the FUSE2 on the MM 
curve. Fig. 7 shows that RECt(I )  will be more than t(IFUSE2) for the fault downstream of the 
FUSE2 which represents fuse fatigue. The occurrence of fuse fatigue may reduce the lifetime of 
the fuse but will not cause the fuse to blow or result in a permanent outage.  
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Fig. 7     Fuse Fatigue Problem 
As the DG penetration level increases the fault current through FUSE2 may increase as 
well. The lateral may therefore suffer a permanent outage during a fault which may be 
potentially temporary. The illustration of the nuisance fuse blowing issue is given in Fig. 8 
where the infeed current from the DG may cause the fuse to operate on the MC curve prior to the 
recloser’s fast operation during a fault. Points 1 and 2 again represent the minimum to maximum 
current range for which coordination holds for the REC and FUSE2. For the permanent 3-phase 
fault on the lateral shown in Fig. 6, point 3 indicates the current seen by the recloser 
AREC
I  on the 
A curve and point 4 indicates the current seen by FUSE2. Fig. 8 shows that ( )
2FUSE
t I  will be less 
than ( )
AREC
t I  for the fault which represents nuisance fuse blowing. Even though this operation 
appears to be correct since FUSE2 isolates the permanent fault downstream of it, were the fault 
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temporary this would have been an incorrect operation and cause an unwarranted permanent 
outage. 
 
Fig. 8     Nuisance Fuse Blowing Problem 
2.5.2.  Fuse Misoperation  
In the radial feeder, the protection zone for a fuse is the lateral and a fuse would operate 
to isolate all faults on the lateral protected by the fuse.  However when the DG is added to the 
feeder lateral, the feeder is no longer radial and the fuse may operate for faults outside the lateral 
(on the main or on other laterals).  This condition is known as fuse misoperation.  In the 
illustration given in Fig. 6, the fault is on the protective zone for FUSE2. However, FUSE1 may 
misoperate during the fault due to the contribution of the infeed current from the DG to the fault. 
This condition will lead to the DG being isolated with lateral and result in an unwanted island. In 
the islanded section, there is a possibility that the total active power supplied by the DG may not 
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match the total load on the island. Therefore, damage to DG and the feeder components in the 
islanded section  may occur in addition to other power quality issues [24]. 
The occurrence of the three described issues will affect the reliability of the feeder 
during temporary or permanent faults. The performance indices used in assessing the reliability 
of a feeder’s OCP scheme are defined in [9], [25]. These indices include the Momentary 
Average Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI) and the System Average Interruption Frequency 
Index (SAIFI). MAIFI pertains to momentary outages of 2 seconds or less, while SAIFI pertains 
to outages of more than 2 seconds [25].  Infeed current from DG during a temporary fault can 
potentially cause nuisance fuse blowing and result in permanent outages. Such circumstances 
will increase the SAIFI value and consequently decrease the feeder’s reliability. 
2.6.  Methodologies Used to Address DG Impact on OCP  
The need to re-coordinate OCPDs on the feeder may arise when OCP problems occur 
due to the presence of DG. Different methodologies have been presented implementing the 
coordination between the OCPDs to mitigate the impact of DG on the feeder’s inherent 
overcurrent protection scheme. These methods are grouped into two, adaptive- and non-
adaptive-based coordination techniques.  The adaptive philosophy is very broad in its definition 
and applications. However, the theme of the technique involves the ability of an OCPD 
(typically a relay) to automatically alter its operating parameters in response to changing power 
system conditions in order to provide reliable relaying decisions [26]. The implementation of 
such technique requires OCPD settings that would accommodate for the changes in the state of 
the feeder. In most cases, such a process would require minimal or no human intervention.  
An adaptive protection scheme with an emphasis on recloser-fuse coordination for a 
distribution feeder with a high penetration level of DG was the focus in [27], [28] . Brahma and 
Girgis in [27] discussed an adaptive method to implement a microprocessor based reclosing 
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scheme to achieve recloser-fuse coordination during a fault on a feeder with a high penetration 
level of DG. The scheme involved developing a user-defined recloser curve to achieve 
coordination between the recloser and fuse when DG is added to the feeder. The microprocessor 
based recloser’s curve was adjusted through an online process in order to maintain coordination 
with the lateral fuses as changes in the feeder’s branch current occurred.  However, the scheme 
assumed that the DG would be disconnected before the first reclose operation when a fault 
occurred on the feeder. Brahma and Girgis in [28] provided another  adaptive scheme for a radial 
feeder with multiple DG constituting a high penetration level. The scheme involved a relay at the 
main feeder that controlled the breakers at the laterals where the fuses were located. By using the 
synchronized vector phasor measurement unit (PMU), the relay measured and detected faults 
that occurred at a given location on the feeder and allowed the breaker to isolate the faulted 
section of the feeder. In the scheme, the fuses did not undergo any operation since isolation of 
the faulted zone was carried out by the breaker operation. The adaptive nature of the scheme was 
based on the ability of the relay to continuously monitor the feeder load flow and short circuit 
parameters following any change in the feeder topology. In the scheme, the relay was the only 
OCPD that provided the trip signal for isolating faults on the entire feeder. Therefore, 
coordination was not implemented. Furthermore, the accuracy of the scheme was dependent on 
the number of DG present in the feeder.  
In the non-adaptive techniques the protective devices do not require online 
measurements to operate for a fault. References [9] and [29] suggested a selective replacement 
of the fuses following system studies for the newly connected DG. The approach was based on 
the fact that fuses were the prevalent OCPDs found on most laterals at the distribution level. The 
fuse sizes were selected based on the assumption that the DG remained connected to the feeder 
at a fixed location and a fixed penetration level.  
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Reference [30] suggested adding directional relays to the OCP scheme for radial 
distribution feeders with DG. In the approach, two directional relays were located at the 
interconnection point between the DG and the feeder. Both relays monitored the phase currents 
at the interconnection point to detect the fault and determine the fault’s direction. Once the fault 
direction was determined, the relay operated the respective breaker to isolate the DG from the 
faulted area and minimize the possibility of recloser-fuse miscoordination.  
2.7.  Overall Assessment of Existing Methods 
The IEEE 1547 standard [31] established the requirements for DG interconnection on 
distribution feeders. The standard maintains that DG should be disconnected from the feeder 
during any disturbance on the feeder. However, the standard does not emphasize specific OCP 
requirements for issues such as OCP coordination in the presence of DG [32]. Currently, the 
available methods, whether adaptive or non adaptive, can be viewed in terms of allowing island 
or non-island based operation. However, in practical terms, prolonged islanded operation of the 
DG with part of the feeder is currently not allowed for two major reasons—reduction in power 
quality of the feeder and complication of service restoration. First, the DG may not be able to 
maintain the voltage and frequency levels within the acceptable level required by the feeder 
resulting in power quality issues. Second, restoration of the feeder will also be complicated 
during delayed autoreclosing and manual switching following the recloser lockout because these 
two processes will require synchronizing the DG and the islanded load with the remaining feeder 
section. Therefore, the assessment of the existing methods will focus on schemes with non-
islanded operation. 
The adaptive protection methods that involve online selection of TCCs are only 
applicable to microprocessor based OCPDs.  The adaptive methods involve altering the recloser 
curves automatically based on the DG status. However to be effective, most of these methods 
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require the use of communication links to continuously monitor the system’s parameters and 
involve modifying the settings of the primary OCPD on the main feeder. Such requirements 
imply that the DG status needs to be constantly ascertained.  
In the non-adaptive methods such as the selective replacement of the fuses, the selected 
fuse may operate incorrectly for faults if the DG penetration level is varied. In the case of the 
directional overcurrent relay scheme, the relay may require sensitive/low settings if the fault is 
several distances away from the DG.  In addition, there must be sufficient quantities of current 
and voltage for a directional decision to be made, especially during close-in 3-phase faults. 
The benefits of high-speed reclosing for distribution feeders employing DG was 
discussed in [33]. High speed reclosing is defined as the autoreclosing of a circuit breaker after a 
necessary time delay to permit fault arc deionization with due regard to coordination with all 
relay protective systems. The duration for the time delay is within 1 second, typically 0.2 
seconds duration is reported in [34]. With high-speed reclosing, the DG is less prone to damage, 
and the risk of operating the DG in an islanded mode for an extended period of time is 
minimized. Two cycle breakers were proposed in [32] to eliminate the contribution of DG infeed 
to the fault and prevent the violation of the short circuit ratings of the OCPDs. Modern multi-
functional reclosers and relays are equipped to combine both high-speed autoreclosing function 
and fast operating breakers. Upgrading the existing OCP scheme using a new approach 
improvises multi-functional reclosers/ relays at the lateral with DG to mitigate the OCP issues. 
This research work is a continuation of the studies carried out by the Power System Automation 
Laboratory at Texas A&M University in College Station.  
2.8.  Problem Formulation 
Selective coordination for faults is one of the fundamental problems in radial distribution 
feeders. Addition of DG to the radial feeder implies that the nominal and fault current is 
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redistributed between the sources, the substation and the DG. The load and fault current through 
the OCPDs may decrease, increase, or remain the same thus coordination may be lost as a result. 
The problem is formulated as a time based coordination problem in which the selectivity rules 
apply. The selectivity rules can be expressed mathematically, as shown below in (2.6) and (2.7). 
For all fault current values through a fuse in question (
iFUSE
I ), the fuse operation time, 
( )
iFUSE
t I , should exceed the recloser’s fast operation, REC At(I ) :  
 ( ) ( ) i
i i
f min FUSE f max,
FUSE REC FUSEA
f min f max
 I I I
t I t I               I   
I , I 0
≤ ≤
> ∀ 
>
 (2.6)  
 
For all fault current values through the fuse in question, the maximum clear time of the 
fuse, ( )
iFUSE
t I , should not exceed the recloser’s delayed time, ( )REC BBt . 
 ( ) ( ) i
i i
f min FUSE f max,
REC FUSE FUSEBB MC
f min f max
 I I I
t t I            I   
I , I 0
≤ ≤
> ∀ 
>
 (2.7)  
 
DG added to the lateral of the feeder causes OCPDs to violate (2.6) and (2.7) when fuse 
fatigue and nuisance fuse blowing issues occur. Therefore, a new approach is added to the 
scheme to mitigate the three OCP issues. The new approach is realized through coordinating the 
added devices with the feeder recloser to ensure that infeed current from the DG can be limited 
during the worst fault conditions which may result in the issues. 
The two radial feeders used for the purpose of this research work include the IEEE 34 
Radial Node Test Feeder and the IEEE 123 Radial Node Test Feeder. The feeder description and 
preliminary assumptions include the following: 
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1. The feeder is radial with a single feeder consisting of  mostly overhead 
distribution lines 
2. The feeder loads are static and do not represent motor loads 
3. The feeder has an existing overcurrent protection scheme comprising of a 
recloser (on the main feeder) and mostly fuses (on the feeder’s laterals) 
4. Fuse saving is implemented 
5. All faults are initially assumed to be temporary 
6. DG is added to reduce the substation’s loading capacity and increase the 
feeder’s capacity, making the feeder DG-dependent 
7. DG is modeled as a synchronous generator, salient pole type 
8. DG locations are the 3-phase laterals of the feeder in order to reduce 
overloading at the substation’s transformer while maintaining close proximity to 
the loads 
9. DG may be able to fully supply the load on the lateral in which the DG is 
located, and DG may be able to supply other loads outside the lateral 
10. The DG unit has an inherent overcurrent protection 
The constraints include the following: 
a. The feeder’s voltage level ( SYSV ) remains within the rated value, RATEDV .  
 RATED MIN SYS RATED MAXV V V− −≤ ≤   (2.8)  
b.  The generators operate within specified real and reactive power limits. 
 DG MIN DG DG MAXP P P− −≤ ≤  (2.9) 
 DG-MIN DG DG-MAXQ Q Q≤ ≤  (2.10) 
c. The substation transformer is not overloaded. 
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Maximum loading (KVA) < 100% of the name plate rating (KVA)   (2.11) 
d. The limit on the total power provided by the DG is subject to a penetration level of 
100% total load. 
 DG LP P≤∑ ∑  (2.12) 
 DG LQ Q≤∑ ∑  (2.13) 
 
where LP  are the LQ real and reactive loads of a radial feeder 
2.9.  Summary 
Coordination in an OCP scheme refers to the overall protection design in which only the 
OCPDs closest to a fault will operate to isolate the faulted section or component. Selective 
coordination of the OCPDs ensures the continuity of service during temporary and permanent 
fault conditions. However, the presence of DG in parallel with the feeder may result in loss of 
coordination between the recloser and the fuses during a temporary or permanent fault, leading 
to issues such as fuse fatigue, nuisance fuse blowing, and fuse misoperation.  
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CHAPTER III 
III. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  A New Approach for a Fuse Saving OCP Scheme 
The main purpose of the new approach is to mitigate the OCP problems with little 
modification to the existing OCP scheme of a feeder. Furthermore, the protection strategy of the 
feeder should ensure maximum protection at minimum cost. When DG is added to a radial 
feeder, temporary faults that are most common on the feeder laterals can result in unwarranted 
permanent outages. These outages are manifested as nuisance fuse blowing issues. Furthermore, 
permanent fault conditions on the main can result in an unwanted island due to fuse 
misoperation. Consequently, the DG and other equipment on the islanded section of the feeder 
may be damaged.  
 The new approach on the existing scheme accounts for all fault conditions on the 
laterals and the main. The protection changes involve replacing the fuse on the lateral with DG 
with a multi-function autorecloser (RLAT). Although not a major contribution to this thesis work, 
an interconnection relay RDG, and a differential relay are added as interconnection protection and 
backup protection for the DG unit respectively. The outline of the approach is discussed in the 
next section. 
3.2.  Outline of the New Approach 
This section describes the new approach and coordination of the added OCPD with the 
recloser in the example feeder provided in Fig. 6. The focus is to determine the worst case 
conditions and coordinate the added OCPDs with the feeder recloser during the conditions. The 
process ensures that coordination will hold for the non-worst case conditions. The worst case 
condition is characterized by the maximum DG penetration level under the worst fault 
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conditions. The worst fault conditions may vary and depend on the line which is faulted. For 
example, in the 1-phase lines the worst fault condition was 1-ph grounded fault, while for the 3-
phase laterals or main, the 3-ph grounded fault was the worst condition. To implement the new 
approach for the worst case conditions, a lateral recloser RLAT and an interconnection relay (RDG) 
are added to the list of OCPDs in the existing scheme.  The added OCPD will allow each 
existing OCPD remaining on the feeder to maintain its settings and remain as the primary 
protection device of its zone.  In short, the fuses would remain the primary protection device for 
the laterals, while the recloser would remain the primary device on the main feeder. The added 
OCPD are the primary protection devices for the lateral with DG.  Fig. 9 illustrates the 
modification of the OCP scheme in the sample feeder discussed in Fig. 6. The protection zones 
are defined for the DG unit location, the feeder main, and the laterals. These OCPDs should 
operate for faults within the zones. Again, the fuses are the primary OCPDs for the laterals, 
while the recloser is the primary OCPD for the main feeder. RLAT is the primary OCPD for the 
lateral with DG. 
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Fig. 9     A Portion of a Typical Radial Feeder with a DG and the OCPDs 
The overlapped protection zones indicate a backup OCPD for the primary OCPD. The 
interconnection relay RDG will trip the adjoining breakers at the interconnection point to prevent 
the DG from islanding with loads and equipment connected to the interconnection point. Overall, 
the feeder recloser provides the backup protection for all other devices to de-energize the entire 
feeder for permanent faults on the main or the laterals of the feeder. The protection changes 
made to the existing OCP scheme are described in next three sections. 
3.3.  System Protection   
The system protection limits the infeed current from DG to prevent unnecessary 
permanent outages during a fault on the laterals. The three single fuses on a 3-phase lateral with 
DG is replaced with a recloser. The settings for the lateral recloser are based on knowledge of 
the OCPD settings in the existing OCP scheme—in particular, the operating time of the feeder 
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recloser in the existing OCP scheme. When DG is added to the feeder the fault current through 
the feeder recloser will decrease thus reducing the reach of the recloser. Therefore, the fastest 
operating time of the feeder recloser is achieved when the feeder is without DG.  
The phase and ground settings of RLAT and REC are coordinated using the composite 
method [35] to clear temporary faults on the feeder main and laterals during the worst case 
conditions. The settings for REC were the default settings used in the existing OCP scheme for 
multiple shot reclosing (1–fast, 2–delayed). The RLAT recloser was configured for a single-shot 
reclosing ( 1–fast , 1–delayed) for its instantaneous trip and lockout operation. The choice of 
selecting reclosing interval for the lateral recloser is explained using the illustration in Fig. 10. 
The upper portion in Fig. 10 shows the status of the recloser (“1” for close status and “0” for 
open) during a time interval (in seconds) specified in the horizontal axis. The bottom illustration 
gives the corresponding frequency change during the time interval. When the fault occurs at tf, 
the recloser opens at a time td and temporarily disconnects the lateral with the DG from the entire 
feeder until the recloser closes again at tr seconds. The difference between td and tr is the 
reclosing or dead time interval (ti). Ref [33] defines the reclosing interval as a function of the 
frequency changes on feeder with DG. Therefore using (3.1), the reclosing interval of RLAT’s fast 
operation was based on substituting an assumed frequency change of +/- 1.5 during 
contingencies such as a fault [36]. The instantaneous reclosing for RLAT was high-speed with an 
8–cycle reclosing interval. The reclosing interval for the feeder recloser was 10 cycles for the 
instantaneous and 60 cycles for the delayed operation. 
s
i
n
P f
f t
2S H
∆
∆ =          (3.1) 
In (3.1), ∆f is the frequency change between the islanded section frequency (fi ) and the 
synchronous frequency at the feeder (fs). The remaining parameters (H, Sn and ∆P) are defined 
for the synchronous generator and the feeder where the paramter H is the inertia constant of the 
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generator whose rating is Sn. The difference between the active power from the DG and the 
islanded loads on the feeder is given by ∆P. In an attempt to provide service restoration 
following an instantaneous reclosing operation, a test was made to ensure that the reclosers were 
coordinated during the worst case situations.  In the test, the recloser nearer to the weaker source 
of fault current (the DG) was the first to reclose. Then, the feeder recloser was reclosed 
afterwards. The stability studies of the DG unit during the high-speed reclosing operation were  
not performed in detail as it was assumed that the synchronizing power from the substation 
would stabilize the DG during the calculated reclosing interval [37]. Also, no voltage check or 
synchronism supervision was applied at the reclosers since the high-speed reclosing operation 
did not require an additional time delay [38] . 
 
Fig. 10   Frequency Change during Autoreclosing 
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The settings for lateral fuses from the existing scheme were only based on either one or a 
combination of the phase current measurements Ia, Ib, and  Ic, since fuses sense phase currents 
only. However, one criterion for selecting the added OCPDs was that the OCPD should be 
capable of operating using the phase and sequence current through the device. The reason for the 
condition is due to the bi-directional power flow introduced by the DG. In such situations, the 
fault current through RLAT would be the vector sum of current from the two sources on the 
feeder. Such conditions may cause RLAT to operate incorrectly for the fault or normal phase 
current. In addition, the unbalanced nature of radial distribution feeders allow the nominal values 
of the negative sequence and zero sequence measurements  to be obtained to determine the 
settings of the MFRs. Results from [35] demonstrated that the sequence measurement improved 
the protection feeder performance. The pickup settings for the added OCPDs involved the use of 
both phase and sequence current measurements for the phase and ground settings. Ref. [2] 
defines the phase line currents as a function of the sequence currents as given by (3.2). 
     [ ] [ ] [ ]abc s 012I A I= •                       (3.2) 
where [ ] 2s s s
2
s s
1 1 1
A 1 a a
1 a a
 
 
=  
  
 
where 0sa 1 120= ∠  
Regarding the choice of time current curves for the added OCPDs, the lateral recloser, 
being a microprocessor based SEL351R offers the advantage of providing up to 38 various 
standard IEEE/IEC time current curves. The specific functional requirements of the recloser 
control employed in this research work include autoreclosing control, and phase fault and ground 
fault overcurrent protection. The phase fault OCP incorporates phase and negative-sequence 
overcurrent elements (51P and 51Q respectively)  to detect phase faults, while the ground fault 
overcurrent protection recloser control incorporates the neutral ground overcurrent elements 
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(51N)  for detection of ground faults [35],[39],[40]. Other features provided for additional 
security include directional elements, load encroachment logic, and torque-control capability. 
The added features were not the focus of this research work, and thus were disabled in the lateral 
recloser’s model. The neutral overcurrent elements respond to the calculated neutral (residual or 
unbalanced) current 03I  as the sum of the phase currents shown in (3.3): 
 0 a b c3I I I I= + +  (3.3) 
3.4.  Interconnection Protection 
The primary purpose of interconnection protection is to prevent long term islanding 
operation of the DG unit with a feeder section.  To achieve this objective, the relay (RDG) is 
placed at the interconnection point to isolate the DG when it is not operating in parallel with the 
entire feeder [41]. This condition may arise during the feeder recloser’s the time-delayed 
operation which may result in long-term islands lasting more than 1 second [38],[42]. The 
interconnection relay employs the 51P and 51Q elements to promptly isolate the DG unit.  The 
51Q element was used instead of the 51N element since no neutral line exists on the delta-delta 
connected transformer and most of the zero sequence current would be trapped in the delta-delta 
loop. Coordination of the 51Q element with the autorecloser’s delayed curve elements was 
through the source-to-load coordination approach [35]. Although the frequency relay is primarily 
used for anti- islanding protection, the function was not implemented since the focus of this 
research work is on overcurrent protection.  
3.5.  DG Unit Protection 
The DG unit is defined by the generator that is directly connected to the associated 
power transformer without a circuit breaker between both components [8]. This type of 
connection is the most common for large generators operating in parallel with the utility. The 
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differential (87TG) protection element shown in Fig. 11 is the most recommended form for DG 
units of this type and serves as backup if the DG has a primary protection device. The 
differential relaying concept eliminates the need to calculate fault currents and does not require 
precise relay settings [5]. Another benefit of applying the differential protection includes 
provision of high sensitivity for both phase and ground faults on the DG unit with the exception 
of high-impedance faults. The protection both isolates both the DG and transformer during 
transformer faults which may be external or internal [43]. External faults are those faults that 
occur outside the transformer. These faults present stress on the transformer and may shorten the 
transformer’s life span. Internal faults occur within the transformer enclosure but such faults are 
not addressed in this research work. 
The illustration in Fig. 11 shows how the differential relay operates to protect the DG 
unit. The current transformer (CT) locations in the differential protection set the protection zone 
for the DG unit. Two current measurement CTs located at the DG unit transformer’s primary and 
secondary terminal provide backup for the DG. The CTs measure each phase current (A, B, C) 
of the line through the DG unit.  CT1 is connected to the primary end of the DG unit, (Generator 
side), while the CT2 is connected to the secondary of the transformer.  
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Fig. 11   DG Unit Backup Protection 
The CTs are of the standard ratio type in which sensitivities on the order of 5A primary 
current can be obtained. The CT locations form the differential protection zone for the generator 
and transformer. The pickup settings for the CTs were based on the maximum DG size.  
3.6.  Protection Coordination in the New Approach  
This section discusses the coordination of the existing and added OCPDs in the new 
approach for the worst case fault conditions (temporary or permanent maximum faults). During 
the worst case fault conditions, if coordination of the OCPDs holds to mitigate the OCP issues 
then it is assumed that the OCP issues are mitigated for the non-worst case situations. The lateral 
recloser and the interconnection relay operate in a 3-phase mode where the three phases are 
simultaneously disconnected during a fault.  
When a fault is on the main feeder, the feeder recloser, the lateral recloser, and the 
interconnection relay operate to clear and isolate the fault. In Fig. 12, the vertical axis gives the 
OCPD status (“0” for open and “1” for close) and the horizontal axis provides the simulation 
period in seconds. For the illustration in Fig. 12, the feeder recloser (R) and lateral recloser (Rlat) 
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operate on their fast curves to clear the fault if it was a temporary fault. Points 1 and 2 indicate 
the lateral recloser’s fast operation (open and close), while points 1’ and 3 give the feeder 
relcoser’s operation. The status of both reclosers changes from 1 to 0 and back to 1 during this 
period. The DG unit remains in parallel with the lateral (on which the DG is located) during the 
operation of both reclosers. For a permanent fault, RDG will operate (indicated by point 4) to 
isolate the DG unit from the feeder before the feeder recloser begin its first delayed operation 
indicated by point 5. The operation of the interconnection relay prevents long-term islanding of 
the DG unit with a section of the feeder. The feeder recloser then goes through two delayed 
operations indicated by points 5 – 6(open and close), and 7(open and lockout) after which the 
recloser will remain in the lockout status to isolate the entire feeder.  
 
Fig. 12   Coordination for Faults on the Main Feeder Using the New Approach 
Fig. 13 shows the coordination of protective devices for a fault on any of the feeder’s 
laterals excluding the lateral with DG. Again, the vertical axis gives the OCPD status (“0” for 
open and “1” for close) and the horizontal axis provides the simulation period in seconds. For a 
potential temporary fault with duration of 4 cycles (staged from 0.01seconds to 0.08 seconds), 
the feeder recloser and the lateral recloser operate on their fast curves to clear the fault. For the 
illustration in Fig. 13, points 1 and 3 indicate the open and reclose operation of the lateral 
recloser while points 2 and 4 give the feeder recloser’s operation. If the fault remains on the 
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lateral, the fuse protecting the lateral will blow to isolate the fault. Point 5 gives the fuse 
operation to isolate a permanent fault. The feeder recloser is the backup device for the fuse in 
case the fuse failed to isolate the fault. In the illustration the recloser does not operate on its 
delayed curve once the fault was isolated by the fuse. The lateral recloser will only operate on its 
delayed curve if the fault were on the lateral with DG. 
 
Fig. 13   Coordination for Faults on Laterals Using the New Approach 
 The afore-described coordination procedure in the new approach in which the primary 
and backup OCPDs’ operation successfully clear and isolate a fault is listed as follows: 
If the fault is on the laterals with fuses: 
1. Lateral recloser (RLAT) trips instantaneously, 
2. Feeder recloser  trips instantaneously, 
3. RLAT closes,  
4. Feeder recloser closes, 
5. Fault is cleared. 
6. If the fault does not clear, the fuse in question blows, 
7. Fault is isolated. 
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8. If the fault is not isolated due to primary OCPD failure,  
9. RDG trips open to isolate the DG,  
10. Feeder recloser trips on the delayed curve and locks out,  
11. Whole system is de-energized and fault is isolated. 
 
For faults on the lateral with DG: 
1. (RLAT) trips instantaneously,  
2. Faulted section is isolated (immediate fault clearing is not required at this location 
because no fuse saving is required for the lateral recloser), 
3. RLAT closes,  
4. Feeder recloser  trips instantaneously, 
5. Feeder recloser closes,  
6. RDG opens to isolate DG and RLAT trips on the delayed curve to lock out,  
7. If the fault is not isolated due to primary OCPD failure,  
8. Feeder recloser trips on the delayed curve and locks out,  
9. Whole system is de-energized and fault is isolated. 
 
If the fault is on the main feeder:   
1. Lateral recloser (RLAT ) trips instantaneously, 
2. Feeder recloser trips instantaneously, 
3. RLAT closes,  
4. Feeder recloser closes,  
5. Fault is isolated. 
6. If the fault is not isolated due to primary OCPD failure,  
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7. RDG trips open to isolate the DG; no current flows through RLAT since fault is on the 
main, 
8. Feeder recloser trips on the delayed curve and locks out,  
9. Whole system is de-energized and fault is isolated. 
 
Again, if coordination is established between the added MFRs and the feeder recloser, 
then coordination will be achieved for the downstream fuses since the fuses were already 
coordinated with the feeder recloser. The source-load procedure used to coordinate the negative-
sequence overcurrent elements with the feeder recloser (since the negative sequence element was 
placed near the DG) is described as follows: 
1. Establish coordination between the phase and ground overcurrent elements using 
standard methods and coordination philosophies. (This process was already established 
in the existing OCPDs, the recloser, and the fuses.) 
2. Start at the most upline negative sequence overcurrent element (51Q of the 
interconnection relay [RDG]) and identify the phase overcurrent element of the next 
downline device, RLAT. 
3. Derive the minimum pickup and curve settings for the 51Q element in terms of 3 2I to 
coordinate with RLAT while maintaining appropriate coordination margins. The cold 
inrush current considerations can be ignored when deriving the settings.  
4. In case the nominal branch current data on the feeder is not available, the minimum 
pickup setting of the 51Q element should not be lower than the minimum pickup value 
of the ground overcurrent 51N element. The negative sequence overcurrent is too low if 
the setting in terms of 3 2I  is less than the minimum pickup of the 51N element in the 
device. 
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3.7.  Summary  
The new approach to upgrade the existing OCP scheme of radial distribution feeder 
involved protection changes at the lateral with the DG. The protection changes provided 
incorporate protection at the system, interconnection, and DG unit levels. Using the composite 
and source-load coordination approach, the added devices were coordinated with the feeder 
recloser such that the existing devices on the feeder retained their settings. The settings for the 
added protective devices were determined for DG sizes up to the maximum penetration level and 
provided in the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IV.  RADIAL TEST FEEDERS USED IN STUDIES 
4.1.  Introduction 
 In order to validate and generalize the performance of the new approach, physical radial 
distribution feeders with an existing overcurrent protection scheme are required. Since such 
requirements were not physically available, a feasible choice was to model two Radial Test 
Feeders, add OCPDs to the feeder, along with the DG model then simulate various case studies. 
The Radial Test Feeders were modeled using DIgSILENT  Powerfactory software version 13.2 
[44]. The model for the appropriate TCC based OCPDs and the salient-pole synchronous 
generators were customized into the software. The OCPDs TCC values were obtained from the 
manufacturer’s database in DIgSILENT and PSS/ADEPT, while the DG model was obtained 
from  [17], [45]. The case studies involved the steady state and transient studies. Table 1 
provides the parameters of the four synchronous generator ratings used to model the various DG 
sizes. The first column gives the name and unit of the generator parameters. The remaining 
columns show the generator parameter for each of the four generators. The subtransient 
quadrature reactance (xq’’) and the stator resistance (Rs) were not available in [45] for the 
3.85MVA DG. Therefore, the two parameters were duplicated from the 2.5MVA DG. Results of 
the OCPD operation during faults were obtained through Electromagnetic transient simulation 
(EMTP) in DIgSILENT. The simulation consisted of an instantaneous time interval with a 1ms 
time step.  
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Table 1    Synchronous Generator Parameters  
Transient Generator Size (MVA)
Parameters 0.406 1.075 2.5 3.85
Vn  (Vrms) 460 460 460 4160
Freq (hz) 60 60 60 60
Td' (s) 0.080 0.185 0.330 3.300
Td'' (s) 0.019 0.025 0.030 0.015
Tq'' (s) 0.019 0.025 0.030 0.050
xd (pu) 2.900 2.890 2.400 2.320
xd' (pu) 0.170 0.250 0.200 0.260
xd''(pu) 0.120 0.170 0.150 0.160
xq (pu) 2.440 1.720 1.770 1.180
xq'' (pu) 0.340 0.290 0.260 0.260*
xl (pu) 0.070 0.080 0.050 0.150
H (s) 0.194 0.322 0.347 1.010
Rs (pu) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003  
4.2.  Radial Test Feeder Models 
4.2.1.  IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder 
The IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder is shown in Fig. 14.  The components found on 
the Radial Test Feeder include capacitor banks, a step-down transformer, and the defined main 
feeder and laterals. There are a total of six 1-phase laterals, labeled 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8; and four 
3-phase laterals labeled 5, 7, 8, and 11.  Laterals 5 and 7 are completely 3-phase lines, while 
lateral 8 combines a 3-phase line with a 1-phase line. Also, laterals 5 and 7 are of special interest 
due to their unique characteristics with respect to the main feeder. Lateral 5, for example, 
operates on a different voltage level, 4.16kV, and produces an undervoltage at its farthest node 
(node 890). The reason for the undervoltage is mostly due to the high magnitude of the constant-
current spot load and the line losses along the length of the lateral.  Lateral 7, on the other hand, 
is the only location with reactive compensation as given in [23]. The two capacitor banks 
identified on the feeder are the extensions of nodes 844 and 848, respectively. Finally, Lateral 
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11, defined as the line section from node 836–840, shares similar characteristics to the main 
feeder. However, using some engineering judgment mentioned in [1, 6, 46], the line section is 
considered a lateral because of its location and proximity to the other 3-phase laterals with 
components. This situation implies that in the event of a fault at that location (836-840), only 
that section will be isolated. Consequently, the feeder’s reliability will be enhanced. 
 
 Fig. 14   IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder (Adopted from [23]) 
4.2.2.  IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder 
The IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder shown in Fig. 15 operates at a 4.16 kV level. 
The feeder consists of two transformers, the substation transformer and a step-down transformer 
(XFM-1). A total of eleven switches, six of which are normally closed (NC) labeled as sw #  and 
the remaining five are normally open, provide the feeder with different configuration options. 
The switches in the NO configuration include those near locations 451, 350, 251, and 195, 151 
and 94. These switches are not required for the feeder’s default operation, thus are disabled 
during the studies in this work. The normally closed switches include those switches connecting 
nodes 150-149, 18-135, 13-152, 60-160, 97-197, and 61-610. This feeder is mostly characterized 
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by overhead lines of 1-phase, 2-phase and 3-phase types. The feeder has an underground line 
segment that operates at the 4.16kV voltage level and consists of 3-phase lines.  
In a similar fashion to the IEEE 34 Node, the IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder 
consists of unbalanced loading with all combinations of load types (PQ, constant I, constant Z). 
However, all the loads are spot loads (totaling eighty-five in number) are located at the various 
nodes on the feeder. The total load is 4.023 MVA at a power factor of 0.8761. The feeder 
consists of four step-type voltage regulators, RG1-RG4 shown in Fig. 15. There are a total of 
four shunt capacitor banks consisting of one 3-phase shunt capacitor bank and three 1-phase 
shunt capacitor banks. These capacitor banks are connected in a wye-wye configuration. The 3-
phase shunt capacitor bank is rated at 200kVar per phase and located at node 83 on the feeder. 
The 1-phase shunt capacitor banks are each rated at 50kVar located at nodes 88, 90, and 92 
respectively. 
 
Fig. 15   IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder (Adopted from [23]) 
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A total number of 139 nodes is initially required to model the feeder in DIgSILENT. 
However, the number of nodes exceeded the software’s requirement (120 nodes per active 
project).  Therefore some nodes connected in series on the feeder were removed to satisfy the 
software’s requirement. The assumptions made to construct the approximate model included 
modifying the old values of the test feeder’s lines and loads, Zold (mi) and Pold (KVA), to the new 
values  (Znew and Pnew) . The voltage square rule described in [1] was used in the approximation 
of the feeder model. Equation (4.1) provides the mathematical relationship between the power 
and load ratio to the voltage VLN   ratio for the line in question.  
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All the combined loads, totaling 49 in number, are indicated in Table 32 of Appendix B. 
The combined loads are assumed as constant PQ type connected in a wye configuration. 
4.3.  Preparation of Radial Test Feeders for Simulation Studies 
In order to prepare the radial test feeders for further studies, the steady state results of 
the modeled feeders were compared with the IEEE’s published results [23]. The load flow 
results include the node voltage, branch current and total power loss results. The short circuit 
studies involve the shunt fault current at the system nodes. Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 show 
the comparison of the node voltage results of the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder modeled in 
DIgSILENT with the IEEE reference results. The first column of Table 2 provides the node on 
the feeder while the remaining columns compare the results of the voltage magnitude and angle 
values between the customized feeder and the IEEE reference. The asterisked section of the last 
column for node 800 implies that division by the base value (0.00) for that node was not 
possible. Table 3 and Table 4 provide similar results for phases B and C respectively. Using the 
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IEEE reference results as the base result, the error (pu) for each node voltage magnitude was less 
than 0.05 pu or 5%. The error margin for the voltage angle between the modeled feeder and the 
IEEE reference was higher especially the angles for phase A.  
Similarly Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 provide the comparison of the node voltage 
results of the IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder modeled in DIgSILENT with the IEEE 
reference results. The first column of Table 5 provide the node on the feeder while the remaining 
columns compares the phase A voltage magnitude and angle results of the customized feeder and 
the IEEE reference. Table 6 and Table 7 provide similar results for phases B and C respectively.  
Table 2    IEEE 34 Node Voltage - Phase A 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u)
800 1.052 1.050 0.002 -4.089 0.000 **
802 1.050 1.048 0.002 -4.139 -0.050 81.774
806 1.048 1.046 0.002 -4.173 -0.080 51.162
808 1.032 1.014 0.018 -4.504 -0.750 5.006
812 0.996 0.976 0.021 -5.324 -1.570 2.391
814 0.968 0.947 0.022 -6.003 -2.260 1.656
RG10 1.032 1.018 0.014 -6.003 -2.260 1.656
816 1.032 1.017 0.014 -6.009 -2.260 1.659
818 1.031 1.016 0.015 -6.016 -2.270 1.650
820 1.009 0.993 0.017 -6.182 -2.320 1.664
822 1.007 0.990 0.017 -6.200 -2.330 1.661
824 1.024 1.008 0.016 -6.132 -2.370 1.587
828 1.023 1.007 0.016 -6.144 -2.380 1.581
830 1.008 0.989 0.018 -6.422 -2.630 1.442
832 1.046 1.036 0.009 -6.936 -3.110 1.230
834 1.041 1.031 0.010 -7.067 -3.240 1.181
836 1.041 1.030 0.010 -7.059 -3.230 1.185
840 1.041 1.030 0.010 -7.059 -3.230 1.185
842 1.041 1.031 0.010 -7.069 -3.250 1.175
844 1.041 1.031 0.010 -7.091 -3.270 1.168
846 1.041 1.031 0.010 -7.129 -3.320 1.147
848 1.041 1.031 0.010 -7.135 -3.320 1.149
850 1.032 1.018 0.014 -6.003 -2.260 1.656
PHASE A:
Magnitude(pu) Angle(deg)
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Table 2 continued 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u)
852 0.980 0.958 0.023 -6.936 -3.110 1.230
RG11 1.046 1.036 0.009 -6.936 -3.110 1.230
854 1.007 0.989 0.018 -6.429 -2.640 1.435
858 1.044 1.034 0.010 -6.996 -3.170 1.207
860 1.041 1.031 0.010 -7.062 -3.240 1.180
862 1.041 1.030 0.010 -7.059 -3.230 1.185
864 1.044 1.034 0.010 -6.996 -3.170 1.207
888 1.006 1.000 0.007 -8.560 -4.640 0.845
890 0.925 0.917 0.009 -9.435 -5.190 0.818
PHASE A:
Magnitude(pu) Angle(deg)
 
Table 3    IEEE 34 Node Voltage - Phase B 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u)
800 1.054 1.050 0.004 -123.617 -120.000 0.030
802 1.053 1.048 0.004 -123.685 -120.070 0.030
806 1.052 1.047 0.004 -123.730 -120.110 0.030
808 1.043 1.030 0.013 -124.145 -120.950 0.026
810 1.043 1.029 0.013 -124.146 -120.950 0.026
812 1.024 1.010 0.014 -125.091 -121.920 0.026
814 1.009 0.995 0.015 -125.852 -122.700 0.026
RG10 1.028 1.026 0.003 -125.852 -122.700 0.026
816 1.028 1.025 0.003 -125.859 -122.710 0.026
824 1.020 1.016 0.004 -126.095 -122.940 0.026
826 1.020 1.016 0.004 -126.097 -122.940 0.026
828 1.019 1.015 0.004 -126.113 -122.950 0.026
830 1.004 0.998 0.006 -126.557 -123.390 0.026
832 1.043 1.035 0.008 -127.358 -124.180 0.026
834 1.039 1.030 0.009 -127.565 -124.390 0.026
836 1.038 1.029 0.009 -127.570 -124.390 0.026
PHASE B:
Magnitude(pu) Angle(deg)
 
50 
 
 
Table 3 continued 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u)
838 1.038 1.029 0.009 -127.573 -124.390 0.026
840 1.038 1.029 0.009 -127.570 -124.390 0.026
842 1.039 1.029 0.009 -127.567 -124.390 0.026
844 1.039 1.029 0.009 -127.591 -124.420 0.025
846 1.039 1.029 0.009 -127.634 -124.460 0.026
848 1.039 1.029 0.009 -127.640 -124.470 0.025
850 1.028 1.026 0.003 -125.852 -122.700 0.026
852 0.978 0.968 0.010 -127.358 -124.180 0.026
RG11 1.043 1.035 0.008 -127.358 -124.180 0.026
854 1.004 0.998 0.006 -126.568 -123.400 0.026
856 1.004 0.998 0.006 -126.575 -123.410 0.026
858 1.041 1.032 0.009 -127.453 -124.280 0.026
860 1.038 1.029 0.009 -127.567 -124.390 0.026
862 1.038 1.029 0.009 -127.570 -124.390 0.026
888 1.004 0.998 0.006 -129.000 -125.730 0.026
890 0.932 0.924 0.009 -130.299 -126.780 0.028
PHASE B:
Magnitude(pu) Angle(deg)
 
Table 4    IEEE 34 Node Voltage - Phase C 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u)
800 1.054 1.050 0.004 116.641 120.000 -0.028
802 1.053 1.048 0.004 116.591 119.950 -0.028
806 1.052 1.047 0.004 116.558 119.920 -0.028
808 1.043 1.029 0.014 116.258 119.300 -0.025
812 1.021 1.007 0.014 115.554 118.590 -0.026
814 1.004 0.989 0.015 114.988 118.010 -0.026
RG10 1.024 1.020 0.003 114.988 118.010 -0.026
816 1.023 1.020 0.003 114.983 118.010 -0.026
824 1.016 1.012 0.004 114.736 117.760 -0.026
828 1.015 1.011 0.005 114.716 117.750 -0.026
830 1.001 0.994 0.007 114.218 117.250 -0.026
832 1.046 1.036 0.010 113.302 116.330 -0.026
834 1.042 1.031 0.011 113.076 116.090 -0.026
836 1.042 1.031 0.011 113.073 116.090 -0.026
840 1.042 1.031 0.011 113.074 116.090 -0.026
842 1.042 1.031 0.011 113.073 116.090 -0.026
844 1.042 1.031 0.011 113.048 116.060 -0.026
PHASE C:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
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Table 4 continued 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (p.u)
846 1.043 1.031 0.011 113.003 116.010 -0.026
848 1.043 1.031 0.011 112.997 116.000 -0.026
850 1.024 1.020 0.003 114.988 118.010 -0.026
852 0.974 0.964 0.011 113.302 116.330 -0.026
RG11 1.046 1.036 0.010 113.303 116.330 -0.026
854 1.000 0.993 0.007 114.205 117.240 -0.026
858 1.044 1.034 0.010 113.199 116.220 -0.026
860 1.042 1.031 0.011 113.073 116.090 -0.026
862 1.042 1.031 0.011 113.073 116.090 -0.026
888 1.007 1.000 0.007 111.689 114.820 -0.027
890 0.924 0.918 0.007 110.594 113.980 -0.030
PHASE C:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
 
Table 5    IEEE 123 Node Voltage - Phase A 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (pu) DIgSILENT IEEE 123  Error (pu)
1 1.026 1.031 0.005 -0.628 -0.660 -0.048
10 1.010 1.006 0.004 -1.405 -1.500 -0.063
101 1.031 1.034 -0.003 -3.310 -3.860 -0.143
105 1.029 1.032 -0.003 -3.364 -3.900 -0.137
108 1.028 1.031 -0.003 -3.438 -3.970 -0.134
109 1.026 1.027 0.000 -3.509 -4.050 -0.134
11 1.010 1.006 0.004 -1.410 -1.510 -0.066
110 1.026 1.025 0.001 -3.546 -4.090 -0.133
111 1.025 1.024 0.001 -3.557 -4.100 -0.133
114 1.025 1.022 0.003 -3.570 -4.150 -0.140
13 1.002 1.008 -0.005 -1.764 -1.870 -0.057
135 0.994 0.999 -0.004 -2.106 -2.290 -0.080
14 1.010 1.006 0.004 -1.401 -1.500 -0.066
149 1.037 1.044 -0.006 0.028 -0.020 -2.415
150 1.000 1.000 0.000
151 0.987 0.990 -0.003 -2.298 -2.530 -0.092
152 1.002 1.008 -0.005 -1.764 -1.880 -0.062
160 0.986 0.988 -0.002 -2.973 -3.520 -0.155
18 0.994 0.999 -0.004 -2.106 -2.290 -0.080
197 1.032 1.035 -0.003 -3.262 -3.820 -0.146
20 0.994 0.997 -0.003 -2.130 -2.330 -0.086
21 0.994 0.998 -0.005 -2.137 -2.340 -0.087
23 0.993 0.998 -0.005 -2.165 -2.390 -0.094
PHASE A:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
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Table 5 continued 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE 123  Error (pu) DIgSILENT IEEE 123  Error (pu)
25 0.992 0.997 -0.005 -2.197 -2.450 -0.103
26 0.992 0.997 -0.005 -2.202 -2.480 -0.112
27 0.991 0.997 -0.005 -2.206 -2.490 -0.114
28 0.992 0.997 -0.005 -2.218 -2.480 -0.106
29 0.992 0.997 -0.005 -2.233 -2.500 -0.107
30 0.992 0.997 -0.005 -2.233 -2.500 -0.107
33 0.991 0.995 -0.005 -2.211 -2.520 -0.123
35 0.992 0.996 -0.004 -2.176 -2.380 -0.086
36 0.992 0.995 -0.003 -2.177 -2.400 -0.093
37 0.992 0.994 -0.002 -2.177 -2.410 -0.097
40 0.991 0.995 -0.004 -2.212 -2.420 -0.086
42 0.989 0.993 -0.004 -2.248 -2.450 -0.082
44 0.988 0.992 -0.004 -2.276 -2.480 -0.082
450 1.031 1.035 -0.003 -3.283 -3.820 -0.141
46 0.988 0.991 -0.003 -2.285 -2.500 -0.086
47 0.987 0.991 -0.004 -2.297 -2.500 -0.081
48 0.987 0.991 -0.004 -2.306 -2.510 -0.081
51 0.987 0.990 -0.003 -2.298 -2.530 -0.092
54 0.997 0.998 0.000 -1.986 -2.530 -0.215
56 0.997 0.997 0.000 -1.989 -2.530 -0.214
57 0.994 0.995 -0.001 -2.294 -2.830 -0.189
60 0.986 0.988 -0.002 -2.973 -3.510 -0.153
61-A 0.986 0.988 -0.002 -2.973 -3.510 -0.153
61-B 0.986 0.988 -0.002 -2.973 -3.510 -0.153
610 0.986 0.988 -0.002 -2.973 -3.510 -0.153
66 0.986 0.986 0.000 -2.984 -3.510 -0.150
67 1.033 1.036 -0.003 -3.206 -3.770 -0.150
7 1.017 1.022 -0.005 -1.066 -1.130 -0.057
71 1.032 1.030 0.002 -3.243 -3.860 -0.160
72 1.033 1.036 -0.003 -3.287 -3.860 -0.149
76 1.032 1.036 -0.004 -3.347 -3.920 -0.146
77 1.032 1.037 -0.005 -3.400 -3.990 -0.148
78 1.032 1.037 -0.005 -3.414 -4.010 -0.149
79 1.031 1.037 -0.005 -3.423 -4.020 -0.148
8 1.011 1.016 -0.005 -1.357 -1.440 -0.058
80 1.032 1.039 -0.007 -3.465 -4.070 -0.149
81 1.033 1.042 -0.008 -3.522 -4.140 -0.149
83 1.033 1.044 -0.010 -3.538 -4.200 -0.158
86 1.032 1.035 -0.003 -3.407 -3.950 -0.137
87 1.032 1.034 -0.002 -3.449 -3.970 -0.131
88 1.033 1.034 -0.001 -3.462 -4.000 -0.135
89 1.032 1.034 -0.002 -3.454 -3.960 -0.128
9 1.010 1.014 -0.004 -1.377 -1.470 -0.063
91 1.032 1.034 -0.002 -3.462 -3.960 -0.126
93 1.032 1.033 -0.001 -3.470 -3.970 -0.126
94 1.032 1.033 -0.001 -3.480 -3.980 -0.126
97 1.032 1.035 -0.003 -3.262 -3.820 -0.146
RG1 1.037 1.044 -0.006 0.028 0.000
RG2-L14 1.010 1.008 0.002 -1.377 -1.470 -0.063
RG3-L26 0.992 0.997 -0.005 -2.197 -2.450 -0.103
PHASE A:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
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Table 6    IEEE 123 Node Voltage - Phase B 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (pu) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (pu)
1 1.045 1.041 0.004 -118.836 -120.330 -0.012
101 1.032 1.030 0.002 -119.852 -122.220 -0.019
105 1.032 1.030 0.002 -119.879 -122.270 -0.020
107 1.032 1.028 0.004 -119.907 -122.320 -0.020
108 1.033 1.031 0.002 -119.879 -122.280 -0.020
12 1.041 1.038 0.003 -119.113 -120.740 -0.013
13 1.039 1.036 0.002 -119.267 -120.970 -0.014
135 1.033 1.032 0.001 -119.387 -121.230 -0.015
149 1.052 1.044 0.008 -118.681 -120.020 -0.011
150 1.014 1.000 0.014 -118.664 -120.000 -0.011
151 1.027 1.025 0.002 -119.587 -121.470 -0.015
152 1.039 1.036 0.002 -119.267 -120.980 -0.014
160 1.028 1.026 0.003 -119.697 -122.010 -0.019
18 1.033 1.032 0.001 -119.387 -121.220 -0.015
197 1.032 1.031 0.002 -119.834 -122.210 -0.019
2 1.045 1.041 0.004 -118.839 -120.330 -0.012
21 1.033 1.032 0.001 -119.387 -121.220 -0.015
22 1.032 1.031 0.002 -119.405 -121.250 -0.015
23 1.033 1.032 0.000 -119.376 -121.200 -0.015
25 1.033 1.033 0.000 -119.369 -121.200 -0.015
28 1.033 1.033 0.000 -119.365 -121.190 -0.015
29 1.033 1.033 -0.001 -119.359 -121.190 -0.015
30 1.033 1.033 -0.001 -119.350 -121.180 -0.015
35 1.031 1.029 0.001 -119.442 -121.310 -0.015
36 1.031 1.029 0.002 -119.442 -121.360 -0.016
39 1.031 1.028 0.003 -119.441 -121.380 -0.016
40 1.030 1.028 0.001 -119.484 -121.360 -0.015
42 1.029 1.027 0.001 -119.528 -121.410 -0.016
43 1.028 1.026 0.002 -119.545 -121.430 -0.016
44 1.028 1.026 0.001 -119.554 -121.440 -0.016
450 1.032 1.029 0.002 -119.860 -122.210 -0.019
47 1.027 1.025 0.001 -119.586 -121.470 -0.016
48 1.026 1.025 0.001 -119.593 -121.470 -0.015
51 1.027 1.025 0.002 -119.587 -121.470 -0.015
54 1.036 1.033 0.002 -119.281 -121.410 -0.018
56 1.036 1.033 0.002 -119.284 -121.430 -0.018
57 1.033 1.031 0.003 -119.425 -121.610 -0.018
PHASE B:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
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Table 6 continued 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE 123 % Error DIgSILENT IEEE 123 % Error
59 1.033 1.030 0.003 -119.433 -121.630 -0.018
60 1.028 1.026 0.003 -119.697 -122.000 -0.019
61-A 1.028 1.026 0.003 -119.697 -122.000 -0.019
61-B 1.028 1.026 0.003 -119.697 -122.000 -0.019
610 1.028 1.026 0.003 -119.697 -122.000 -0.019
66 1.027 1.022 0.006 -119.654 -121.870 -0.018
67 1.033 1.031 0.002 -119.807 -122.190 -0.020
7 1.043 1.040 0.003 -118.999 -120.570 -0.013
72 1.031 1.030 0.001 -119.863 -122.290 -0.020
76 1.030 1.030 0.001 -119.911 -122.380 -0.020
77 1.031 1.031 0.000 -119.950 -122.460 -0.020
78 1.031 1.031 0.000 -119.955 -122.480 -0.021
79 1.031 1.031 0.000 -119.956 -122.480 -0.021
8 1.041 1.038 0.003 -119.109 -120.740 -0.014
80 1.032 1.033 -0.001 -119.974 -122.540 -0.021
81 1.033 1.035 -0.002 -119.969 -122.570 -0.021
83 1.033 1.038 -0.004 -119.982 -122.630 -0.022
86 1.028 1.028 0.000 -119.976 -122.550 -0.021
87 1.027 1.027 0.000 -120.007 -122.630 -0.021
89 1.026 1.027 -0.001 -120.031 -122.680 -0.022
90 1.026 1.027 -0.001 -120.039 -122.720 -0.022
91 1.026 1.027 0.000 -120.040 -122.690 -0.022
93 1.026 1.027 0.000 -120.051 -122.710 -0.022
95 1.026 1.026 0.000 -120.066 -122.730 -0.022
96 1.026 1.026 0.000 -120.069 -122.730 -0.022
97 1.032 1.031 0.002 -119.834 -122.210 -0.019
RG1 1.052 1.044 0.008 -118.681 -120.000 -0.011
RG4-67 1.035 1.032 0.003 -119.697 -122.010 -0.019
PHASE B:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
 
Table 7    IEEE 123 Node Voltage - Phase C  
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (pu) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (pu)
1 1.035 1.035 0.000 120.090 119.600 0.004
101 1.013 1.033 -0.020 118.606 117.590 0.009
PHASE C:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
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Table 7 continued 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (pu) DIgSILENT IEEE Ref  Error (pu)
104 1.012 1.028 -0.016 118.561 117.490 0.009
105 1.013 1.034 -0.020 118.633 117.610 0.009
108 1.012 1.033 -0.020 118.663 117.650 0.009
13 1.014 1.020 -0.006 119.370 118.900 0.004
135 1.008 1.012 -0.004 119.140 118.830 0.003
149 1.046 1.044 0.002 120.424 119.980 0.004
15 1.013 1.018 -0.005 119.351 118.870 0.004
150 1.008 1.000 0.008 120.435 120.000 0.004
151 1.003 1.007 -0.004 118.888 118.580 0.003
152 1.014 1.020 -0.006 119.370 118.890 0.004
160 0.988 1.005 -0.017 118.750 117.750 0.008
17 1.013 1.018 -0.005 119.331 118.860 0.004
18 1.008 1.012 -0.004 119.140 118.830 0.003
197 1.014 1.034 -0.020 118.615 117.590 0.009
21 1.007 1.011 -0.004 119.099 118.810 0.002
23 1.007 1.010 -0.003 119.065 118.790 0.002
24 1.006 1.009 -0.002 119.045 118.770 0.002
25 1.006 1.009 -0.003 119.043 118.800 0.002
26 1.007 1.002 0.004 119.011 118.790 0.002
27 1.007 1.002 0.005 119.011 118.790 0.002
28 1.006 1.009 -0.003 119.038 118.800 0.002
29 1.006 1.008 -0.003 119.027 118.790 0.002
3 1.034 1.033 0.001 120.068 119.570 0.004
30 1.005 1.008 -0.003 118.998 118.770 0.002
32 1.007 1.001 0.005 118.995 118.770 0.002
34 1.014 1.019 -0.005 119.357 118.880 0.004
35 1.007 1.011 -0.004 119.063 118.770 0.002
4 1.034 1.033 0.002 120.061 119.560 0.004
40 1.006 1.010 -0.004 119.015 118.720 0.002
41 1.005 1.010 -0.004 119.009 118.710 0.003
42 1.005 1.009 -0.005 118.974 118.680 0.002
PHASE C:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
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Table 7 continued 
Node DIgSILENT IEEE 123 % Error DIgSILENT IEEE 123 % Error
450 1.013 1.033 -0.019 118.596 117.530 0.009
47 1.003 1.007 -0.005 118.893 118.610 0.002
48 1.003 1.007 -0.005 118.885 118.600 0.002
51 1.003 1.007 -0.004 118.888 118.580 0.003
54 1.008 1.014 -0.006 119.264 118.430 0.007
56 1.008 1.014 -0.006 119.261 118.430 0.007
57 1.002 1.011 -0.010 119.103 118.210 0.008
6 1.034 1.031 0.003 120.048 119.530 0.004
60 0.988 1.005 -0.017 118.750 117.760 0.008
61-A 0.988 1.005 -0.017 118.750 117.760 0.008
61-B 0.988 1.005 -0.017 118.750 117.760 0.008
610 0.988 1.005 -0.017 118.750 117.760 0.008
66 0.985 0.996 -0.010 118.758 117.700 0.009
67 1.015 1.035 -0.019 118.631 117.610 0.009
7 1.027 1.029 -0.002 119.828 119.350 0.004
72 1.013 1.034 -0.021 118.537 117.500 0.009
75 1.012 1.029 -0.017 118.500 117.400 0.009
76 1.012 1.035 -0.023 118.499 117.450 0.009
77 1.011 1.036 -0.024 118.468 117.370 0.009
78 1.011 1.036 -0.024 118.460 117.350 0.009
79 1.011 1.036 -0.024 118.466 117.360 0.009
8 1.022 1.025 -0.004 119.650 119.180 0.004
80 1.010 1.037 -0.025 118.408 117.240 0.010
81 1.010 1.037 -0.027 118.355 117.140 0.010
83 1.010 1.039 -0.028 118.340 117.070 0.011
85 1.009 1.034 -0.024 118.313 117.070 0.011
86 1.011 1.036 -0.025 118.449 117.420 0.009
87 1.010 1.037 -0.026 118.416 117.390 0.009
89 1.010 1.037 -0.027 118.408 117.380 0.009
91 1.010 1.038 -0.027 118.402 117.360 0.009
92 1.009 1.038 -0.027 118.391 117.310 0.009
93 1.010 1.038 -0.027 118.406 117.370 0.009
95 1.010 1.038 -0.027 118.407 117.370 0.009
97 1.014 1.034 -0.020 118.615 117.600 0.009
RG1 1.046 1.044 0.002 120.424 120.000 0.004
RG3-L26 1.007 1.003 0.004 119.043 118.800 0.002
RG4-67 1.019 1.037 -0.017 118.750 117.750 0.008
PHASE C:
Magnitude (pu) Angle (deg)
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After comparing the results with the IEEE published reference, an overcurrent protection 
scheme with a fuse-saving philosophy was provided for the Radial Test Feeder as shown in Fig. 
16. The OCP scheme included OCPDs, recloser and fuses. The recloser was added to the main 
while fuses were added to the laterals and the in-line components, capacitor banks and step-
down transformer. Each fuse’s protection zone is identified in Fig. 16 as the lateral on which the 
fuse is placed. The recloser’s protection zone is the main. A similar approach was provided for 
the IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder as shown in Fig. 17. In addition to the feeder recloser in 
Fig. 17, another recloser was used on lateral 1 and lateral 4 of the feeder because no fuse was 
available in the protection database that satisfied the selectivity criteria for the maximum fault on 
both laterals. The possible locations for DG placement are also provided in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 in 
addition to the location of the overcurrent protective devices. These locations are numerically 
labeled and shown in the legend placed on both illustrations. 
 
Fig. 16   IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder with OCPDs and Possible DG Locations 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17   IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder with OCPDs (Adopted from [23]) 
4.4.  Summary  
In addition to the synchronous generator model for the DG, two radial test feeders, the 
IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder and the IEEE 123 Radial Test Feeder were modeled in 
DIgSILENT as test beds for the thesis work. The steady state and transient simulation studies 
were conducted on both feeders. The steady state studies included load flow, short circuit studies 
to validate the base case results of the two feeders with the existing reference. The next chapter 
discusses the simulation studies conducted on both radial test feeders when DG is placed at 
strategic locations on the feeders. 
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CHAPTER V 
V.  SIMULATION STUDIES 
5.1.  Introduction  
The transient simulation studies involved staging a temporary and permanent fault on the 
feeder to determine the impact of DG on the existing fuse saving based OCP scheme during the 
fault. The fault was placed at several locations on the feeder to include downstream of the 
laterals and on the main.  In the transient simulation procedure, all the system conditions were 
initialized starting at –0.05s. The temporary fault duration was 5 cycles (assuming a short 
duration for the fault) or 10 cycles (assuming a longer duration for the fault) [4],  [47]. The new 
approach was applied to the existing OCP scheme of both feeders to mitigate the three OCP 
issues which were identified. 
Prior to adding DG to the feeder, the recloser and the fuse in the existing OCP scheme 
were coordinated and fuse saving was maintained. After DG was added to the feeder, 
coordination no longer held for some fuses. The next sections discuss the six main cases that 
were studied where each case corresponded to a potential DG location. Cases 1 through 4 
involved the four DG locations on the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder while Cases 5 and 6 
involved the IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder. The cases provided results of the recloser and 
fuse operation prior to the applying the approach and after the approach was applied to the 
existing scheme.  
5.2.  Simulation Cases on the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder 
Exhaustive studies were conducted on the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder to validate 
the performance of the new approach to mitigate the fuse misoperation, fuse fatigue and 
nuisance fuse blowing issues that were determined. The case studies involved the four DG 
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locations on the feeder illustrated in Fig. 16. For each case study, the minimum and maximum 
fault types (temporary and permanent) were staged on the feeder. Again, in each of the case 
study, a single DG (up to 2.5 MVA) was interconnected at the remote end of the 3-phase laterals 
located on the feeder after which the OCP issues were identified. The next subsections discuss 
the studies performed on the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder. 
5.2.1. Case 1  
This case described how the DG impacted the existing OCP scheme when the DG was 
placed at location 1 of the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder in Fig. 16. The DG location 
corresponded to the remote end of lateral 11, node 840.  
In one example which typifies one of the worst case scenarios, a maximum (temporary 
and permanent L-L-L-G) fault was placed downstream of the three individual fuses (F7) on 
lateral 7 with a DG (sized at 2.5 MVA) connected to node 840. All the three individual fuses on 
the lateral underwent nuisance fuse blowing during the L-L-L-G fault. Fig. 18 illustrates a 
nuisance fuse blowing issue that developed as a result of the scenario described. In this situation, 
the fuse protecting phase B of the 3-phase lateral was the first to blow at 0.052s. As observed, 
the feeder recloser (denoted by R in the case studies) failed to operate to give the fault a chance 
to clear before the fuse blew. Therefore, the fuse saving philosophy adopted for the recloser-fuse 
coordination was lost during the 10 cycle fault duration. Consequently, an unwarranted 
permanent outage evolved during the temporary fault. One reason for the feeder recloser’s 
failure to operate was due to the redistributed fault current between the DG and the substation 
which caused the fault current magnitude through the feeder recloser (which is near the 
substation) to decrease. The vertical axis in Fig. 18 gives the OCPD status (“0” for open and “1” 
for close) and the horizontal axis provides the corresponding operating time in seconds. As 
shown, the recloser status remained at 1 during the simulation period which indicated that the 
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recloser remained closed during the fault. On the other hand, the fuse’s status changed from 1 to 
0 at 0.052s, indicating a fuse blowing operation during the fault period.  
 
Fig. 18   Case 1: Nuisance Fuse Blowing before Applying the New Approach 
Fig. 19 illustrates the current through the fuse during the fault and the horizontal axis 
corresponds to the simulation duration in seconds. As shown, the current became zero during the 
10 cycle fault duration. 
 
Fig. 19   Case 1: Fault Current through Fuse before Applying the New Approach 
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Fig. 20 displays the operation of the feeder recloser, the lateral recloser (RLat), and fuse 
(F7) after applying the new approach to the existing OCP scheme to mitigate the nuisance fuse 
blowing issue illustrated in Fig. 18. The vertical axis in Fig. 20 gives the OCPD status (“0” for 
open and “1” for close) and the horizontal axis corresponds to the duration of the simulation time 
in seconds. Again, the duration for the simulation was 0.5s. As the fault was initiated at 
0.01seconds, the lateral recloser and the feeder recloser both operated to de-ionize the fault arc. 
RLat opened at 0.031s and reclosed at 0.163s. R opened at 0.081s and reclosed ten cycles later at 
0.247s. As shown, the status of F7 did not change from 1 to 0 which meant that fuse did not 
blow during the temporary fault duration. Therefore the nuisance fuse blowing issue was 
mitigated. Consequently, an unwarranted permanent outage was prevented and the continuity of 
service was maintained at the lateral protected by the fuse as illustrated in Fig. 21.  
 
Fig. 20   Case 1: Nuisance Fuse Blowing Mitigated after Applying the New Approach 
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Fig. 21   Case 1: Fault Current through Fuse after the New Approach 
During this period the lateral recloser’s phase settings (51P1) comprised of a time dial 
settings (TDS) of 0.1 and the pickup of 80A. For the ground (51N1) settings, the TDS was 0.1 
and the pickup was 3.2A. The TCC type was 102. The settings of the feeder recloser remained 
the same. The details of the devices’ settings are listed in Appendix A of this thesis. The 
remaining two issues fuse misoperation and fuse fatigue also occurred for this case.  
Table 8 provides the recloser fuse coordination results during the staged temporary fault 
which resulted in nuisance fuse blowing. The results include the worst case scenario where the 
maximum fault and maximum DG penetration level were applied. The first column of the table 
indicates a fuse number which protects a lateral and this number also corresponds to the lateral 
number (For example, fuse 1 protects lateral 1). The second column provides the fault type 
added downstream of the fuse. The third and fourth column give the recloser operation (open and 
reclose) for the fault while the final column indicates the fuse’s operation.  
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Table 8     Case 1: Temporary Fault Coordination before the New Approach 
Fuse Fault R  Opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.037 0.203
_
1-ph-gZf 0.051 0.218
_
2 1-ph-g 0.065 0.232
_
1-ph-gZf 0.354 0.520
_
3 1-ph-g 0.070 0.237
_
1-ph-gZf 0.109 0.276
_
4 1-ph-g 0.141 0.307
_
1-ph-gZf 0.215 0.381
_
6 1-ph-g 0.156 0.323
_
1-ph-gZf 0.251 0.418
_
7 3-ph-g 0.052
1-ph-gZf 0.286
8 3-ph-g 0.060
1-ph-gZf 0.192  
During the worst case situation, the individual fuses on lateral 7 and lateral 8 blew prior 
to the feeder recloser’s operation on its fast curve. The nuisance blowing of the individual fuses 
resulted in permanent outages at the two laterals. The fuses on the 1-phase laterals, lateral fuses 
F1-F4, and F6 did not undergo nuisance fuse blowing during the worst case scenario. Table 9 
provides the coordination results between the feeder recloser, the lateral recloser, and the fuses 
after the new approach was implemented on the existing OCP scheme to mitigate the nuisance 
fuse blowing issues that occurred during the temporary fault. The first column of the table 
indicates a fuse protecting a lateral while the second column gives the fault type on that lateral. 
The third and fourth column provide the operating time of the lateral recloser during the fault 
while the fifth and sixth column corresponds to the feeder recloser’s operating time. The fuse 
blowing time is given in the last column (the “-” symbol signifies that the fuse did not blow). In 
addition, Table 10 provides the coordination results between the feeder recloser, lateral recloser 
and fuses for a permanent fault situation after the new approach was implemented on the existing 
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OCP scheme. The asterisked sections on the last column in Table 10 correspond to the slowest 
operation of the three single fuses on each of the 3-phase lateral. After this time, all the three 
phases of the 3-phase lateral would have operated. 
Table 9     Case 1: Temporary Fault Coordination after the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.034 0.167 0.037 0.203
-
1-ph-gZf 0.041 0.175 0.051 0.218
-
2 1-ph-g 0.036 0.170 0.063 0.230
-
1-ph-gZf 0.529 0.663 0.340 0.507
-
3 1-ph-g 0.033 0.167 0.065 0.232
-
1-ph-gZf 0.039 0.173 0.098 0.265
-
4 1-ph-g 0.035 0.168 0.114 0.280
-
1-ph-gZf 0.040 0.174 0.153 0.319
-
6 1-ph-g 0.037 0.170 0.130 0.296
-
1-ph-gZf 0.037 0.171 0.165 0.331
-
7 3-ph-g 0.031 0.164 0.079 0.246
-
1-ph-gZf 0.036 0.169 0.179 0.346
-
8 3-ph-g 0.031 0.164 0.085 0.252
-
1-ph-gZf 0.034 0.184 0.168 0.351
-
 
Table 10   Case 1: Permanent Fault Coordination after the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.034 0.167 0.037 0.203 0.225
1-ph-gZf 0.041 0.175 0.051 0.218 0.290
2 1-ph-g 0.036 0.170 0.063 0.230 0.329
1-ph-gZf 0.529 0.663 0.340 0.507 1.178
3 1-ph-g 0.033 0.167 0.065 0.232 0.292
1-ph-gZf 0.039 0.173 0.098 0.265 0.377  
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Table 10 continued 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
4 1-ph-g 0.035 0.168 0.114 0.280 0.459
1-ph-gZf 0.040 0.174 0.153 0.319 0.666
6 1-ph-g 0.037 0.170 0.130 0.296 0.472
1-ph-gZf 0.037 0.171 0.165 0.331 0.692
7 3-ph-g 0.031 0.164 0.079 0.246 0.254*
1-ph-gZf 0.036 0.169 0.179 0.346 0.549*
8 3-ph-g 0.031 0.164 0.085 0.252 0.226*
1-ph-gZf 0.034 0.184 0.168 0.351 0.581*  
5.2.2. Case 2  
This case describes how the DG impacted the existing OCP scheme of the feeder when 
the DG was placed at location 2 of the feeder in Fig. 16. Studies were performed with DG sizes 
up to 2.5 MVA at this location. Typically the OCP design of the radial feeder is such that the 
three single phase fuses protecting the lateral should only operate to isolate a fault on the 3-phase 
lateral. However, the fuses misoperated during an upstream fault (outside the lateral). In one 
example which typifies a worst case scenario, a L-L-L-G fault was placed upstream of (on node 
834) the three single phase fuses with the DG penetration level at 100% (2.5MVA). Table 11 
provides the operating time of the fuses on the 3-phase lateral during the fuse misoperation issue. 
The first column of the table indicates the fuse that is located on each phase of the lateral. The 
second and third columns provide the feeder recloser’s operating time for the fault while the last 
column shows the fuse operating time during the fault. Of the three individual fuses protecting 
the lateral, the fuse on phase B was the first to misoperate followed by fuses on phase A, and C 
respectively. 
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Table 11   Case 2: Fuse Misoperation Issues before the New Approach 
Fuse R  Opens R  Closes Fuse blows
#  (s)  (s)  (s)
7 (Ph.A) 0.082 0.248 0.1767
7 (Ph.B) 0.082 0.248 0.153
7 (Ph.C) 0.082 0.248 1.179  
Fig. 22 illustrates the operation of the fuse (labeled as F7) and the feeder recloser during 
the fault. As shown in the illustration, F7 on phase B blew at 0.153 seconds to isolate the 
unfaulted phase of the lateral causing permanent outage on that phase. As a result, the DG is 
islanded with the remaining two phases causing an unbalance on the unfaulted lateral. As 
illustrated in Fig. 22, the feeder recloser operated (opened at 0.081seconds and closed at 0.248 
seconds) since the fault was on the main (node 834). 
Fig. 23 shows the same case scenario after implementing the new approach on the 
existing OCP scheme. In the illustration, after the fault was initiated at 0.01seconds, the lateral 
recloser and the feeder recloser both operated to clear the fault. The lateral recloser opened all 
the three phases at 0.028 seconds and reclosed at 0.162 seconds (from status 1 to 0 and back to 
1) in which the lateral was temporarily isolated. However, the lateral recloser did not operate on 
its delayed curve to permanently isolate the unfaulted 3-phase lateral. This situation implied that 
the device misoperation was mitigated. During the simulation duration the feeder recloser 
opened at 0.082 seconds and reclosed at 0.248 seconds. 
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Fig. 22   Case 2: Fuse Misoperation of F7 before Applying the New Approach 
.  
Fig. 23   Case 2: Fuse Misoperation Mitigated after Applying the New Approach 
5.2.3. Case 3  
This case discussed how the DG impacted the existing OCP scheme when the DG was 
placed at the remote end of lateral 8. A maximum fault was placed downstream of the lateral 
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fuses on the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder with DG at location 3 (node 862) of Fig. 16. Fig. 
24 and Fig. 25 give the results before applying the new approach while Fig. 26 and Fig. 27 show 
the results after the new approach was applied.  Fig. 24 illustrates a nuisance fuse blowing issue 
in which F11 on phase B of the 3-phase lateral blew prior to the recloser operation during the 
temporary fault. Given the magnitude of the fault current, the fuse underwent fatiguing followed 
by blowing at 0.060 seconds within the fault duration (0.176seconds). The current through the 
fuse during the fault is shown in Fig. 25. Again, the current became zero during the 10 cycle 
fault duration. 
 
Fig. 24   Case 3: Nuisance Fuse Blowing before Applying the New Approach 
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Fig. 25   Case 3: Fault Current through Fuse before Applying the New Approach 
Fig. 26 displays the operation of the feeder recloser, lateral recloser, and F11 operation 
after applying the new approach to mitigate the fuse fatigue and nuisance fuse blowing issues. 
The duration for the simulation was 0.5s. As the fault is initiated at 0.01seconds, the lateral 
recloser operated to reduce the infeed current from the DG by opening at 0.030s and closing at 
0.163s. R opened at 0.086s and reclosed at 0.252s. F11 did not operate and a permanent outage 
during the temporary fault was prevented. Therefore the fuse fatigue and nuisance fuse blowing 
issues were mitigated. Continuity of service was maintained at the lateral protected by the fuse 
F11. 
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Fig. 26   Case 3: Nuisance Fuse Blowing Mitigated after Applying the New Approach 
 
Fig. 27   Case 3: Current through Fuse after Applying the New Approach 
The results for the studies performed in this case study are summarized in three tables. 
Table 12 provides the recloser - fuse coordination results during the staged temporary fault. 
Again, the results include the worst case scenario where the maximum fault and maximum DG 
penetration level were applied. The minimum fault was a 1-phase grounded fault with a 20 ohm 
fault impedance value. When the fault was temporary during the worst case situation, two fuses 
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F7 and F11 blew and resulted in permanent outages at two locations lateral 7 and 11. The 
recloser failed to operate during the two nuisance fuse blowing situations. As shown Lateral 
fuses F1-F4, and F6 did not blow during the temporary fault and were consequently saved. The 
highlighted sections of the last column of the table correspond to the fastest blowing operation of 
the three single fuses on a 3-phase lateral which caused the lateral to be unbalanced. 
Table 13 provides the reclosers and fuses operation for a temporary fault after 
implementing the new approach to the existing protection scheme while Table 14 shows the 
reclosers and fuses operation for a permanent fault after implementing the new approach to the 
existing protection scheme. 
Table 12   Case 3: Temporary Fault Coordination before the New Approach 
Fuse Fault R  Opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.037 0.203
_
1-ph-gZf 0.044 0.211
_
2 1-ph-g 0.065 0.232
_
1-ph-gZf 0.354 0.521
_
3 1-ph-g 0.070 0.237
_
1-ph-gZf 0.110 0.277
_
4 1-ph-g 0.141 0.307
_
1-ph-gZf 0.215 0.382
_
6 1-ph-g 0.156 0.323
_
1-ph-gZf 0.252 0.418
_
7 3-ph-g 0.051
1-ph-gZf 0.287
11 3-ph-g 0.060
1-ph-gZf 0.306 0.472 0.422  
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Table 13   Case 3: Temporary Fault Coordination after the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.034 0.167 0.037 0.203
_
1-ph-gZf 0.041 0.175 0.051 0.217
_
2 1-ph-g 0.036 0.170 0.063 0.229
_
1-ph-gZf 0.552 0.686 0.364 0.531
_
3 1-ph-g 0.033 0.167 0.065 0.232
_
1-ph-gZf 0.039 0.172 0.098 0.265
_
4 1-ph-g 0.035 0.168 0.111 0.278
_
1-ph-gZf 0.040 0.174 0.148 0.315
_
6 1-ph-g 0.037 0.170 0.128 0.295
_
1-ph-gZf 0.037 0.170 0.191 0.357
_
7 3-ph-g 0.030 0.164 0.084 0.251
_
1-ph-gZf 0.036 0.169 0.179 0.346
_
11 3-ph-g 0.031 0.164 0.085 0.252
_
1-ph-gZf 0.037 0.170 0.179 0.346
_
 
Table 14   Case 3: Permanent Fault Coordination before the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R  Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.034 0.167 0.037 0.203 0.224
1-ph-gZf 0.041 0.175 0.051 0.217 0.289
2 1-ph-g 0.036 0.170 0.063 0.229 0.328
1-ph-gZf 0.552 0.686 0.364 0.531 1.361
3 1-ph-g 0.033 0.167 0.065 0.232 0.292
1-ph-gZf 0.039 0.172 0.098 0.265 0.377
4 1-ph-g 0.035 0.168 0.111 0.278 0.501
1-ph-gZf 0.040 0.174 0.148 0.315 0.752
6 1-ph-g 0.037 0.170 0.128 0.295 0.457
1-ph-gZf 0.037 0.170 0.191 0.357 0.692
7 3-ph-g 0.030 0.164 0.084 0.251 0.218*
1-ph-gZf 0.036 0.169 0.179 0.346 0.771
11 3-ph-g 0.031 0.164 0.085 0.252 0.235*
1-ph-gZf 0.037 0.170 0.179 0.346 0.653  
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5.2.4. Case 4  
This case investigated how the DG impacted the existing OCP scheme when the DG was 
placed at the remote end of lateral 12. A maximum temporary and permanent fault was placed 
downstream of each lateral fuse of the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder with the DG placed at 
location 4 (node 890) in Fig. 16. No nuisance fuse blowing issues occurred during this case for 
the temporary fault situation. However, fuse misoperation and fuse fatigue issues occurred 
during a fault on the feeder and the approach was applied to mitigate the issues. 
Table 15 provides the recloser fuse coordination results during the staged temporary 
fault for the studies performed. The results include the worst case scenario where the maximum 
fault and maximum DG penetration level were applied. As shown in the table, coordination held 
between the fuses and the feeder recloser during the fault. Consequently, no nuisance fuse 
blowing issues occurred. An additional step that was taken was to replace the fuse protecting the 
step-down transformer with a differential relay. The differential relay operates instantaneously 
only when the fault is either on the step-down transformer’s primary or secondary sides. 
Table 16 provides the recloser and fuses operation for a permanent fault before 
implementing the new approach to the existing protection scheme while Table 17 gives the 
results after the new approach was implemented. The asterisked sections on the last column of 
both tables indicate the slowest operating time of the fuse which indicates that the fault would be 
completely isolated. 
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Table 15   Case 4: Temporary Fault Coordination before the New Approach 
Fuse Fault R  Opens R  Closes Fuse Melts
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.037 0.203 0.036
1-ph-gZf 0.124 0.291
_
2 1-ph-g 0.063 0.230
_
1-ph-gZf 0.241 0.408
_
3 1-ph-g 0.065 0.232
_
1-ph-gZf 0.103 0.269
_
4 1-ph-g 0.126 0.293
_
1-ph-gZf 0.180 0.347
_
6 1-ph-g 0.136 0.303
_
1-ph-gZf 0.197 0.364
_
7 3-ph-g 0.084 0.250
_
1-ph-gZf 0.229 0.395
_
8 3-ph-g 0.089 0.255
_
1-ph-gZf 0.261 0.428
_
11 3-ph-g 0.089 0.256
_
1-ph-gZf 0.227 0.394
_
 
Table 16   Case 4: Permanent Fault Coordination before the New Approach 
Fuse Fault R  Opens R  Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.037 0.203 0.237
1-ph-gZf 0.124 0.291 0.309
2 1-ph-g 0.063 0.230 0.428
1-ph-gZf 0.241 0.408 1.308
3 1-ph-g 0.065 0.232 0.344
1-ph-gZf 0.103 0.269 0.476
4 1-ph-g 0.126 0.293 0.526
1-ph-gZf 0.180 0.347 0.730
6 1-ph-g 0.136 0.303 0.560
1-ph-gZf 0.197 0.364 0.777
7 3-ph-g 0.084 0.250 0.300
1-ph-gZf 0.229 0.395 0.695
8 3-ph-g 0.089 0.255 0.368*
1-ph-gZf 0.261 0.428 0.792*
11 3-ph-g 0.089 0.256 0.374*
1-ph-gZf 0.227 0.394 0.707*  
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Table 17   Case 4: Permanent Fault Coordination after the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat  opens Rlat  opens R  opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
1 1-ph-g 0.042 0.176 0.037 0.203 0.236
1-ph-gZf 0.248 0.370 0.051 0.218 0.237
2 1-ph-g 0.044 0.177 0.063 0.230 0.393
1-ph-gZf 0.344 0.478 0.241 0.408 1.269
3 1-ph-g 0.041 0.174 0.066 0.232 0.323
1-ph-gZf 0.045 0.178 0.094 0.260 0.422
4 1-ph-g 0.045 0.178 0.112 0.279 0.448
1-ph-gZf 0.066 0.199 0.153 0.319 0.593
6 1-ph-g 0.044 0.177 0.122 0.289 0.460
1-ph-gZf 0.046 0.179 0.160 0.327 0.604
7 3-ph-g 0.031 0.165 0.083 0.250 0.391*
1-ph-gZf 0.180 0.346 0.055 0.188 0.614
8 3-ph-g 0.032 0.166 0.087 0.254 0.393*
1-ph-gZf 0.193 0.360 0.050 0.184 0.533
11 3-ph-g 0.032 0.166 0.085 0.252 0.399*
1-ph-gZf 0.177 0.344 0.053 0.186 0.477  
5.2.5. Summary of Cases 1 - 4 
This summary gives the results from the exhaustive case studies performed on the IEEE 
34 node radial test feeder. The studies included the worst case situations and totaled 768. The 
results are provided in Table 18 where the first column provides the three OCP issues fuse 
fatigue, nuisance fuse blowing, and fuse misoperation. The second column indicates the DG size 
on the feeder that caused the OCP issues. The third and fourth columns provide number of the 
three issues found on the feeder prior to implementing the new approach on the existing OCP 
scheme of the feeder and after the new approach was implemented. The results indicated that 
there were a total of 18 nuisance fuse blowing, 46 fuse fatigue issues and 24 fuse misoperation 
issues prior to implementing the new approach on the existing OCP scheme of the IEEE 34 node 
radial test feeder. After the new approach was implemented on the OCP scheme of both radial 
test feeders, there were only 2 fuse fatigue issues (where the fuses began to melt before the 
recloser’s fast operation) and no fuse misoperation or nuisance fuse blowing issues. 
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Table 18   OCP Issues on the IEEE 34 Node Test Feeder before and after the New Approach 
OCP Issues occuring on DG Size Tot. # Tot. # 
the Radial Feeder (MVA) Before After
0.406 0 0
Fuse Fatigue 1.075 2 0
2.5 46 2
0.406 0 0
Nuisance Fuse Blowing 1.075 0 0
2.5 18 0
0.406 0 0
Fuse Misoperation 1.075 12 0
2.5 12 0  
5.3   Simulation Cases on the IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder 
5.3.1. Case 5  
Similar studies conducted on the IEEE 34 Node were performed on the IEEE 123 Node 
Radial Test Feeder to investigate how the DG impacted the existing OCP scheme when the DG 
was placed at the remote end of a 3-phase lateral on location 1 (node 48) of the feeder. A fault 
was placed downstream of the lateral fuses of the feeder with DG as shown in Fig. 17 .  
In one of the studies conducted a temporary L-G fault was placed downstream of a 
single phase fuse (F10) on a 1-phase lateral (phase A type). The fault was initiated at 0.01 
seconds with a 10 cycle duration. During the temporary fault duration, it is expected that the 
feeder recloser will trip to clear the fault and prevent F10 from melting before the recloser’s fast 
operation began. Fig. 28 provides the operation of F10 and the feeder recloser during the fault 
period. Here the status of the fuse remained at 1 and changes to 0 when melting began. As 
shown, after the fault was initiated, R opened at 0.053 seconds and closed at 0.220 seconds. 
However, F10 became fatigued at 0.053 seconds, around the same time the feeder recloser began 
its fast operation. Fig. 29 shows the same scenario after implementing the new approach on the 
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existing OCP scheme in which the fuse did not melt during the 10 cycle fault duration. 
Therefore, fuse fatigue was mitigated in this situation. 
 
Fig. 28   Case 5: Fuse Fatigue on F10 before Applying the New Approach 
 
Fig. 29   Case 5: Fuse Fatigue on F10 Mitigated after Applying the New Approach 
In another scenario in which nuisance fuse blowing was investigated, a L-G fault 
downstream of F14 caused the fuse to blow prior to the feeder recloser completing its first 
operation. This situation occurred when the maximum DG size was placed on the feeder as well. 
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The illustration in Fig. 30 shows the operation of F14 and the feeder recloser, while Fig. 31 
shows the fault current through F14 during the nuisance blowing situation. As the fault is 
initiated at 0.01seconds, R opened at 0.045seconds and reclosed at 0.211 seconds. However, F14 
blew at 0.171 seconds. 
 
Fig. 30   Case 5: Nuisance Fuse Blowing before Applying the New Approach 
The vertical axis in Fig. 31 gives the phase fault current through the fuse, while the 
horizontal axis corresponds to the fault current duration in seconds. Fig. 32 and Fig. 33 show the 
same scenario after implementing the new approach on the existing OCP scheme. After 
implementing the new approach, F14 was saved during the occurrence of the temporary fault. 
The fuse saving was achieved due to the operation of the lateral recloser with the feeder recloser 
to allow the temporary fault to clear without blowing the fuse.  As shown in Fig. 32, the lateral 
recloser opened at 0.20s and reclosed at 0.153s while R opened at 0.042s and reclosed at 0.209s. 
Continuity of service was maintained at the lateral protected by F14 as shown in Fig. 32. For the 
lateral recloser phase element (51P1), the time dial settings (TDS) was 0.1 and the pickup was 
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400A. The TDS was 0.1 and the pickup was 3.2A for the ground element (51N1). The TCC type 
for both elements was 103.  
 
Fig. 31   Case 5: Fault Current through the Fuse before Applying the New Approach 
 
Fig. 32   Case 5: Nuisance Fuse Blowing Mitigated after Applying the New Approach 
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Fig. 33   Case 5: Current through Fuse after Applying the New Approach 
Table 19 provides the recloser and fuse coordination results during the staged temporary 
fault for Case 5. In addition, the results from the worst case scenario where the maximum fault 
and maximum DG penetration level were applied are included in the table. Table 20 gives the 
OCPDs’ (reclosers and fuses) operation for a temporary fault after implementing the new 
approach to the existing protection scheme. The highlighted sections on the last column imply 
that nuisance fuse blowing occurred at the lateral in question. As indicated four fuses underwent 
fuse blowing when a maximum fault was placed downstream of each fuse. Table 21 provides the 
OCPDs’ operation for a permanent fault after implementing the new approach to the existing 
protection scheme. 
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Table 19   Case 5: Temporary Fault Coordination before the New Approach 
Fuse Fault R  Opens R  Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)
F3 1-ph-g 0.033 0.200
_
F5 1-ph-g 0.030 0.196
_
F6 1-ph-g 0.037 0.203
_
F7 1-ph-g 0.038 0.205
_
F8 1-ph-g 0.041 0.208
_
F9 1-ph-g 0.045 0.212
_
F10 1-ph-g 0.052 0.219
_
F11 1-ph-g 0.033 0.199
_
F12 1-ph-g 0.040 0.171
F13 1-ph-g 0.045 0.211 0.092
F14 1-ph-g 0.045 0.212 0.174
F15 1-ph-g 0.034 0.200
_
F16 1-ph-g 0.045 0.211
_
F17 1-ph-g 0.048 0.214
_
F18 1-ph-g 0.033 0.199
_
F20 1-ph-g 0.067 0.234
_
F21 1-ph-g 0.095 0.261
_
F22 1-ph-g 0.099 0.266
_
F23 1-ph-g 0.092 0.259
_
F24 1-ph-g 0.127 0.294 0.263
F25 3-ph-g 0.033 0.199
_
F26 1-ph-g 0.057 0.224
_
F27 1-ph-g 0.057 0.224
_
F28 1-ph-g 0.062 0.229
_
F29 3-ph-g 0.031 0.197
_
 
Table 20   Case 5: Temporary Fault Coordination after the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R  Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
F3 1-ph-g 0.020 0.154 0.033 0.200
_
F5 1-ph-g 0.016 0.149 0.030 0.196
_
F6 1-ph-g 0.021 0.154 0.036 0.203
_
F7 1-ph-g 0.027 0.160 0.037 0.204
_
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Table 20 continued 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R  Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
F8 1-ph-g 0.016 0.150 0.038 0.205
_
F9 1-ph-g 0.017 0.151 0.041 0.207
_
F10 1-ph-g 0.022 0.155 0.046 0.213
_
F11 1-ph-g 0.023 0.080 0.033 0.199
_
F12 1-ph-g 0.016 0.149 0.037 0.204
_
F13 1-ph-g 0.027 0.160 0.042 0.209
_
F14 1-ph-g 0.021 0.154 0.042 0.209
_
F15 1-ph-g 0.027 0.160 0.034 0.200
_
F16 1-ph-g 0.023 0.156 0.042 0.208
_
F17 1-ph-g 0.021 0.154 0.044 0.211
_
F18 1-ph-g 0.015 0.149 0.032 0.199
_
F20 1-ph-g 0.024 0.157 0.057 0.223
_
F21 1-ph-g 0.032 0.166 0.072 0.239
_
F22 1-ph-g 0.024 0.157 0.069 0.236
_
F23 1-ph-g 0.034 0.168 0.090 0.257
_
F24 1-ph-g 0.016 0.149 0.032 0.199
_
F25 3-ph-g 0.015 0.149 0.032 0.199
_
F26 1-ph-g 0.022 0.155 0.049 0.216
_
F27 1-ph-g 0.029 0.162 0.050 0.217
_
F28 1-ph-g 0.024 0.157 0.054 0.221
_
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Table 21   Case 5: Permanent Fault Coordination after the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R  Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
F3 1-ph-g 0.020 0.154 0.033 0.200 0.320
F5 1-ph-g 0.016 0.149 0.030 0.196 0.306
F6 1-ph-g 0.021 0.154 0.036 0.203 0.289
F7 1-ph-g 0.027 0.160 0.037 0.204 0.334
F8 1-ph-g 0.016 0.150 0.038 0.205 0.346
F9 1-ph-g 0.017 0.151 0.041 0.207 0.363
F10 1-ph-g 0.022 0.155 0.046 0.213 0.297
F11 1-ph-g 0.023 0.080 0.033 0.199 0.350
F12 1-ph-g 0.016 0.149 0.037 0.204 0.246
F13 1-ph-g 0.027 0.160 0.042 0.209 0.215
F14 1-ph-g 0.021 0.154 0.042 0.209 0.260
F15 1-ph-g 0.027 0.160 0.034 0.200 0.249
F16 1-ph-g 0.023 0.156 0.042 0.208 0.361
F17 1-ph-g 0.021 0.154 0.044 0.211 0.373
F18 1-ph-g 0.015 0.149 0.032 0.199 0.308
F20 1-ph-g 0.024 0.157 0.057 0.223 0.336
F21 1-ph-g 0.032 0.166 0.072 0.239 0.318
F22 1-ph-g 0.024 0.157 0.069 0.236 0.341
F23 1-ph-g 0.034 0.168 0.090 0.257 0.334
F24 1-ph-g 0.015 0.149 0.032 0.199 0.309
F25 3-ph-g 0.011 0.145 0.032 0.199 0.280*
F26 1-ph-g 0.022 0.155 0.049 0.216 0.607
F27 1-ph-g 0.029 0.162 0.050 0.217 0.590
F28 1-ph-g 0.024 0.157 0.054 0.221 0.704  
5.3.2. Case 6  
This case investigated how the DG impacted the existing OCP scheme when the DG was 
placed at the remote end of a 3-phase lateral (node 450) in Fig. 17. In this case, the DG location 
was farther away from the substation of the IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder. In the studies, 
the presence of DG on the feeder lateral caused fuse fatigue, nuisance fuse blowing, and 
misoperation issues.  
In one example which describes the nuisance fuse blowing issue, a maximum fault was 
placed downstream of lateral fuses of the feeder with the DG (size of 3.85 MVA) at location 2 in 
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Fig. 17. Fig. 34 shows the operation of the feeder recloser and F21 when a L-G fault in Fig. 35 
was initiated at 0.01s and cleared after 10 cycles.  The feeder recloser opened at 0.108s and 
reclosed at 0.273s. During this reclosing interval F21 blew at 0.111s leading to a permanent 
outage before the fault was cleared. Fig. 36 and Fig. 37 show the operation of the OCPDs after 
the new approach was applied to mitigate the nuisance fuse blowing issue. When the fault was 
initiated, R opened at 0.08s and reclosed at 0.247s. The lateral recloser opened at 0.040s and 
reclosed at 0.202s. Both reclosers’ operations provided enough time for the fault to clear and 
prevented the permanent outage from occurring during the temporary fault. 
 
Fig. 34   Case 6: Nuisance Fuse Blowing before Applying the New Approach 
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Fig. 35   Case 6: Fault Current through the Fuse before Applying the New Approach 
 
Fig. 36   Case 6: Nuisance Fuse Blowing Mitigated after Applying the New Approach 
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Fig. 37   Case 6: Current through Fuse after Applying the New Approach 
Table 22 provides the recloser fuse coordination results during the staged temporary 
fault for the nuisance fuse blowing issue. In addition, the results are for the worst case scenario 
in which the OCPDs operation during the maximum fault and the maximum DG penetration 
level were studied. The nuisance fuse blowing occurred at two locations on the feeder, laterals 
21 and 24. Table 23 gives the reclosers and fuses operation for a temporary fault after 
implementing the new approach to the existing protection scheme while Table 24 shows the 
devices’ operation for a permanent fault after implementing the new approach. The asterisked 
section of the last column of Table 24 corresponds to the slowest operation of the three single 
fuses on a 3-phase lateral which caused the entire lateral to be permanently isolated. 
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Table 22   Case 6: Temporary Fault Coordination before the New Approach 
Fuse Fault R  Opens R  Closes Fuse
#  Type  (s)  (s) blows
F3 1-ph-g 0.033 0.200
_
F4 1-ph-g 0.031 0.197
_
F5 1-ph-g 0.030 0.196
_
F6 1-ph-g 0.037 0.203
_
F7 1-ph-g 0.038 0.205
_
F8 1-ph-g 0.041 0.208
_
F9 1-ph-g 0.044 0.211
_
F10 1-ph-g 0.052 0.218
_
F11 1-ph-g 0.033 0.200
_
F12 1-ph-g 0.039 0.206
_
F13 1-ph-g 0.045 0.211
_
F14 1-ph-g 0.046 0.213
_
F15 1-ph-g 0.034 0.200
_
F16 1-ph-g 0.045 0.212
_
F17 1-ph-g 0.050 0.217
_
F18 1-ph-g 0.032 0.065
_
F20 1-ph-g 0.074 0.241
_
F21 1-ph-g 0.106 0.273 0.108
F22 1-ph-g 0.101 0.268
_
F23 1-ph-g 0.106 0.272
_
F24 1-ph-g No-op No-op 0.135
F26 1-ph-g 0.058 0.224
_
F27 1-ph-g 0.061 0.228
_
F28 1-ph-g 0.067 0.233
_
F29 3-ph-g 0.032 0.198
_
 
Table 23   Case 6: Temporary Fault Coordination after the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
F3 0.031 0.164 0.033 0.200 0.323
_
F5 0.027 0.160 0.030 0.196 0.304
_
F6 0.032 0.165 0.037 0.203 0.274
_
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Table 23 continued 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens R Closes Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
F7 0.035 0.169 0.038 0.205 0.333
_
F8 0.044 0.177 0.041 0.208 0.365
_
F9 0.044 0.177 0.045 0.211 0.401
_
F10 0.047 0.181 0.052 0.219 0.279
_
F11 0.029 0.163 0.033 0.200 0.377
_
F12 0.130 0.264 0.129 0.295 0.306
_
F13 0.134 0.267 0.136 0.303 0.325
_
F14 0.042 0.175 0.045 0.212 0.236
_
F15 0.029 0.162 0.034 0.200 0.241
_
F16 0.031 0.165 0.044 0.211 0.368
_
F17 0.027 0.161 0.049 0.215 0.387
_
F18 0.026 0.159 0.032 0.199 0.284
_
F19 0.043 0.176 0.084 0.250 0.363
_
F20 0.036 0.170 0.063 0.230 0.338
_
F21 0.040 0.173 0.080 0.247 0.312
_
F22 0.043 0.176 0.078 0.245 0.355
_
F23 0.043 0.177 0.081 0.247 0.362
_
F24 0.135 0.268 0.192 0.359 0.426
_
F26 0.028 0.161 0.053 0.220 0.554
_
F27 0.029 0.162 0.056 0.222 0.543
_
F28 0.032 0.166 0.060 0.226 0.635
_
F29 0.028 0.161 0.032 0.198 0.244
_
 
Table 24   Case 6: Permanent Fault Coordination after the New Approach 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
F3 1-ph-g 0.031 0.164 0.033 0.200
F5 1-ph-g 0.027 0.160 0.030 0.196
F6 1-ph-g 0.032 0.165 0.037 0.203
F7 1-ph-g 0.035 0.169 0.038 0.205  
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Table 24 continued 
Fuse Fault Rlat   opens Rlat Closes R  Opens Fuse blows
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)  (s)
F8 1-ph-g 0.044 0.177 0.041 0.208
F9 1-ph-g 0.044 0.177 0.045 0.211
F10 1-ph-g 0.047 0.181 0.052 0.219
F11 1-ph-g 0.029 0.163 0.033 0.200
F12 1-ph-g 0.130 0.264 0.129 0.295
F13 1-ph-g 0.134 0.267 0.136 0.303
F14 1-ph-g 0.042 0.175 0.045 0.212
F15 1-ph-g 0.029 0.162 0.034 0.200
F16 1-ph-g 0.031 0.165 0.044 0.211
F17 1-ph-g 0.027 0.161 0.049 0.215
F18 1-ph-g 0.026 0.159 0.032 0.199
F20 1-ph-g 0.036 0.170 0.063 0.230
F21 1-ph-g 0.040 0.173 0.080 0.247
F22 1-ph-g 0.043 0.176 0.078 0.245
F23 1-ph-g 0.043 0.177 0.081 0.247
F24 1-ph-g 0.135 0.268 0.192 0.359
F26 1-ph-g 0.028 0.161 0.053 0.220
F27 1-ph-g 0.029 0.162 0.056 0.222
F28 1-ph-g 0.032 0.166 0.060 0.226
F29 3-ph-g 0.027 0.160 0.032 0.230*  
5.3.3. Summary of Cases 5 - 6 
Table 25 summarizes results of the case studies conducted during the maximum fault 
studies on the IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder when the DG is placed at the two locations 
shown in Fig. 17. The first column of the table provides the three OCP issues, while the second 
column gives the number of issues found on the feeder prior to implementing the new approach 
on the existing OCP scheme of the feeder. The number of issues remaining after the new 
approach was implemented is given in the last column. As observed, all of the nuisance fuse 
blowing and fuse misoperation issues were completely mitigated after implementing the new 
approach to the existing OCP scheme. However, the fuse fatigue issues were not fully mitigated 
for the fuses F13, F21, and F24. 
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Table 25   OCP Issues on the IEEE 123 Node Test Feeder before and after the Approach 
OCP Issues on Tot # Tot #
the Radial Feeder Before After
Fuse Fatigue 34 3
Nuisance Fuse Blowing 13 0
Fuse Misoperation 6 0  
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CHAPTER VI 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1.  Summary   
 A new approach to mitigate overcurrent protection issues on radial distribution feeders 
with DGs was developed in the Power System Automation Lab at Texas A&M University.  First, 
two Radial Test Feeders, the IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder and the IEEE 123 Node Radial 
Test Feeder, were modeled and provided with conventional protective devices and a fuse-saving 
overcurrent protection scheme. Load flow and short circuit analysis studies were conducted on 
these feeders using DIgSILENT Powerfactory software to determine the settings and 
coordination of the protective devices. Four sizes of the salient pole synchronous generator 
models were then customized in DIgSILENT and added to the Radial Test Feeders to identify 
the three OCP issues caused by the DG.  
The new approach revises the existing overcurrent protection scheme through protection 
changes only at the lateral with the DG. The three individual fuses protecting the lateral is 
replaced with a multi-functional recloser to prevent the infeed current from the DG which causes 
the OCP issues. The recloser uses phase overcurrent measurements and sequence overcurrent 
measurements for its settings to provide the required operation with the feeder recloser to 
mitigate the OCP issues, nuisance fuse blowing, fuse fatigue, and fuse misoperation. In addition, 
an interconnection protection and DG unit protection were added to prevent long term islanding 
and backup protection for the DG, respectively. The composite and source-to-load coordination 
methods were used to provide phase and ground setting coordination between the added OCPDs 
and the existing feeder recloser.  
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6.2.  Conclusions 
This thesis work discussed a new approach to mitigate the impact of DG on the 
overcurrent protection scheme of radial distribution feeders. Four DG sizes (0.406MVA, 1.075 
MVA, 2.50, and 3.85 MVA) individually placed at 3-phase lateral ends of two IEEE Radial Test 
Feeders proved the validity and generality of the new approach on radial distribution feeders. 
The OCP issues addressed by the new approach included fuse misoperation, fuse fatigue, and 
nuisance fuse blowing. The new approach included protection for the feeder and the DG unit, 
using an off-the-shelf multifunction recloser and a relay to mitigate the three OCP issues found.  
The new approach completely mitigated the fuse misoperation and nuisance fuse 
blowing issues that were present on the radial feeders. However, there were some situations 
where the fuse fatigue issues were not fully mitigated, meaning a fuse began melting before the 
feeder recloser and lateral recloser fast operation began. Nevertheless, such issues would not 
result in unwarranted permanent outages.  
6.3.  Future Work 
The focus of the future work will be to readdress the unmitigated fuse fatigue issues. 
Furthermore exhaustive studies on the IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder will be performed, 
considering additional DG location(s) on the feeder. Also, the extension of implementing the 
new approach to multiple feeders will be investigated. 
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APPENDIX A 
A.  IEEE 34 Node Radial Test Feeder 
 
The IEEE 34 Node test feeder’s parameters were downloaded from [23] and include the 
overhead line configurations along with the impedance and susceptance, line segment data, spot 
loads, distributed loads, shunt capacitors, transformer data, voltage regulator data and load flow 
results. The load flow node voltage results and short circuit results were compared to the 
reference results. The list of existing OCPDs and the settings of the selected OCPDs in the new 
approach are provided in the tables that follow. 
Table 26   Selected OCPDs for the IEEE 34 Node Test Feeder 
From To Prot. Nomenclature Irated
 Node Node Device Type (A) Manufacturer
800 802 Recloser CME-FORM4 (1Fast, 2 100 Cooper/McGraw
808 810 Fuse 1 KEARNEY X4 4 Kearney
816 818 Fuse 2 KEARNEY T15 15 Kearney
824 826 Fuse 3 KEARNEY X4 4 Kearney
854 856 Fuse 4 KEARNEY X4 4 Kearney
832 XFM-1 Fuse 5 COOPER/ NEMA T-TIN10T 10 Cooper/McGraw
858 864 Fuse 6 KEARNEY X4 4 Kearney
834 842 Fuse 7 COOPER/NEMA K-TIN20K 20 Cooper/McGraw
836 862 Fuse 8 KEARNEY X4 4 Kearney
844 Cap-844 Fuse 9 GEEJO-1 (SIZE C)10E 10 General Electric
848 Cap-848 Fuse 10 GEEJO-1 (SIZE D)15E 15 General Electric
836 840 Fuse 11 KEARNEY X4 4 Kearney
888 890 Fuse 12 R200ST – 50E 50E Westinghouse  
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Table 27   Base Case: Recloser-Fuse Coordination for the IEEE 34 Node Test Feeder 
Fuse Fault R  Opens R  Closes Fuse Operates
#  Type  (s)  (s )  (s )
1 1-ph-gZf 0.045 0.212 0.302
1-ph-g 0.036 0.202 0.234
2 1-ph-gZf 0.117 0.284 1.245
1-ph-g 0.059 0.225 0.500
3 1-ph-gZf 0.076 0.243 0.501
1-ph-g 0.061 0.210 0.385
4 1-ph-gZf 0.108 0.275 0.725
1-ph-g 0.088 0.255 0.558
6 1-ph-gZf 0.112 0.279 0.878
1-ph-g 0.098 0.265 0.702
7 1-ph-gZf 0.116 0.282 0.928*
3-ph-g 0.072 0.238 0.447*
8 1-ph-gZf 0.124 0.290 0.881*
3-ph-g 0.071 0.238 0.498*
11 1-ph-gZf 0.117 0.283 0.925*
3-ph-g 0.072 0.238 0.499*  
Table 28   Case 1-4: Interconnect Relay Settings  
DG             Phase  Settings       Ground  Settings
 Location TDS Ipickup (A) TCC TDS Ipickup (A) TCC
840 1 80 101 1 6 101
848 0.55 64 C5 0.9 10 C5
862 0.5 80 101 1.15 8 101
890 0.5 300 101 1 2 101  
Table 29   Case 1-4: Lateral Recloser – Instantaneous Curve Settings 
DG  Phase  Settings Ground  Settings
 Location TDS Ipickup (A) TCC TDS Ipickup (A) TCC
840 0.1 80 102 0.1 3.2 102
848 0.1 61 102 0.1 3 102
862 0.1 80 102 0.1 3.2 102
890 0.1 300 102 0.1 0.1 102  
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Table 30   Case 1-4: Lateral Recloser - Delayed Curve Settings 
DG  Phase  Settings Ground  Settings
 Location TDS Ipickup (A) TCC TDS Ipickup (A) TCC
840 2 80 102 2 3.2 120
848 2 70 U3 1.15 3.2 120
862 2 80 102 1.15 3.2 120
890 2 300 102 2 0.1 120
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APPENDIX B 
B.  IEEE 123 Node Radial Test Feeder 
 
The IEEE 123 Node test feeder’s parameters were downloaded from [23] and include 
the overhead line configurations along with the impedance and susceptance, line segment data, 
spot loads, distributed loads, shunt capacitors, switches, transformer data, voltage regulator data 
and load flow results. The load flow node votage results and short circuit results were compared 
to the reference results. There were some variances in the short circuit results owing to the line 
modifications made.  The list of OCPDs and the settings of the selected OCPDs in the new 
approach are provided below. 
 Table 31   Selected OCPDs for the IEEE 123 Node Test Feeder 
From To ProtectiveNomenclature Manufacturer's I rated I asymetric
Node  Node  Device Type Name (A)  (KA)
1 149 R main  SEL351R* SEL 800 12.00
1 2 RL1  SEL351R* SEL 60 12.00
1 6 RL2  SEL351R* SEL 60 12.00
8 11 F3 DOMF3-150 Dominion 150 9.85
8 12 RL4  SEL351R* SEL 60 12.00
13 17 F5 R400TL-80E Westinghouse 80E 9.78
18 20 F6 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
21 22 F7 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
23 24 F8 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
26 32 F9 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
27 33 F10 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
35 39 F11 DOMF3-150 Dominion 150 9.85
40 41 F12 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
42 43 F13 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
44 46 F14 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
57 59 F15 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
67 71 F16 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
72 75 F17 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
76 85 F18 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
87 88 F20 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
89 90 F21 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
91 92 F22 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
93 94 F23 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
95 96 F24 NEMAT-50T Cooper 50T 8.17
97 450 F25 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
101 104 F26 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
105 107 F27 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
108 114 F28 DOMF3-100 Dominion 100 10.00
47 48 F29 R400TL-65E Westinghouse 65E 9.78  
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Table 32   Total Load Distribution for the Modeled IEEE 123 Node Test Feeder 
Node Load Ph-1 Ph-1 Ph-2 Ph-2 Ph-3 Ph-3
Model kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr
5 Y-I 0 0 0 0 20 10
6 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
10 Y-I 20 10 0 0 0 0
11 Y-Z 40 20 0 0 0 0
16 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
17 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
19 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
20 Y-I 40 20 0 0 0 0
31 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
32 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
38 Y-I 0 0 20 10 0 0
39 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
45 Y-I 20 10 0 0 0 0
46 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
49 Y-PQ 35 25 70 50 35 25
50 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
51 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
52 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
53 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
58 Y-I 0 0 20 10 0 0
59 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
60 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
62 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
63 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
64 Y-I 0 0 75 35 0 0
65 D-Z 35 25 35 25 70 50
66 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 75 35
68 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
69 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
70 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
73 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
74 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
77 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
80 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
82 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
83 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
84 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
85 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
98 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
99 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
100 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
102 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
103 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
104 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
106 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
107 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
109 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
112 Y-I 20 10 0 0 0 0
113 Y-Z 40 20 0 0 0 0
114 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
Total 1420 775 915 515 1155 635  
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The following section of the Appendix provides the reclosers and fuses operation in 
overcurrent protection scheme for a maximum and minimum permanent fault during the base 
case condition. 
Table 33   Base Case: Recloser - Fuse Coordination for the IEEE 123 Node Test Feeder 
Fuse Fault R opens R closes Fuse Operates
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)
F3 1-ph-g Zf 0.451 0.617 6.483
1-ph-g 0.032 0.199 0.204
F5 1-ph-g Zf 0.584 0.751 10.898
1-ph-g 0.029 0.195 0.208
F6 1-ph-g Zf 0.462 0.629 2.834
1-ph-g 0.035 0.202 0.253
F7 1-ph-g Zf 0.779 0.945 2.861
1-ph-g 0.034 0.200 0.269
F8 1-ph-g Zf 0.591 0.757 3.082
1-ph-g 0.035 0.202 0.306
F9 1-ph-g Zf 0.590 0.757 3.082
1-ph-g 0.037 0.204 0.322
F10 1-ph-g Zf 0.473 0.640 1.532
1-ph-g 0.043 0.209 0.255
F11 1-ph-g Zf 0.809 0.976 2.648
2-ph-g 0.032 0.198 0.352*
F12 1-ph-g Zf 0.593 0.760 1.446
1-ph-g 0.035 0.201 0.229
F13 1-ph-g Zf 0.835 1.001 1.376
1-ph-g 0.037 0.204 0.228
F14 1-ph-g Zf 0.079 0.245 0.495
1-ph-g 0.031 0.197 0.228
F15 1-ph-g Zf 0.769 0.935 2.769
1-ph-g 0.032 0.199 0.234
F16 1-ph-g Zf 0.466 0.633 2.699
1-ph-g 0.039 0.206 0.322
F17 1-ph-g Zf 0.584 0.751 2.738
1-ph-g 0.038 0.205 0.333
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Table 33 continued 
Fuse Fault R opens R closes Fuse Operates
#  Type  (s)  (s)  (s)
F18 1-ph-g Zf 0.589 0.756 1.554
1-ph-g 0.030 0.197 0.236
F20 1-ph-g Zf 0.478 0.644 1.543
1-ph-g 0.049 0.216 0.303
F21 1-ph-g Zf 1.056 1.223 1.508
1-ph-g 0.056 0.222 0.292
F22 1-ph-g Zf 0.585 0.752 1.585
1-ph-g 0.063 0.229 0.320
F23 1-ph-g Zf 0.484 0.651 1.602
1-ph-g 0.058 0.225 0.330
F24 1-ph-g Zf 1.140 1.306 1.608
1-ph-g 0.073 0.239 0.324
F25 1-ph-g Zf 0.585 0.751 3.274
3-ph-g 0.030 0.197 0.239*
F26 1-ph-g Zf 0.585 0.752 2.911
1-ph-g 0.041 0.208 0.356
F27 1-ph-g Zf 0.955 1.122 2.913
1-ph-g 0.043 0.210 0.349
F28 1-ph-g Zf 0.482 0.648 2.681
1-ph-g 0.047 0.213 0.395
F29 1-ph-g Zf 0.476 0.643 7.071
3-ph-g 0.029 0.196 0.235*  
Table 34   Case 5-6: Interconnect Relay Settings
DG           Phase  Settings         Ground  Settings
 Location TDS Ipickup (A)  TCC TDS Ipickup (A) TCC
48 2 400 101 0.5 30 U1
450 2 500 101 0.5 40 U1  
Table 35   Case 5-6: Lateral Recloser - Instantaneous Curve Settings 
DG           Phase  Settings         Ground  Settings
 Location TDS Ipickup (A)  TCC TDS Ipickup (A) TCC
48 0.1 400 103 0.05 3.2 103
450 0.1 500 103 0.1 3.2 103  
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Table 36   Case 5-6: Lateral Recloser - Delayed Curve Settings 
DG           Phase  Settings         Ground  Settings
 Location TDS Ipickup (A)  TCC TDS Ipickup (A) TCC
48 1 400 165 0.1 3.2 C1
450 1.15 500 165 0.1 3.2 C1  
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